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I INTRODUCTION 
 
Ideally, the introduction to this article would contain two photos.  One would be a 
photo of Lunada Bay.  Lunada Bay is a rocky, horseshoe-shaped bay below a green 
park in the Palos Verdes neighbourhood of Los Angeles.  It is a spectacular surf 
break, offering long and powerful rides.  The other photograph would be of horrific 
injuries sustained by Nat Young, a former world surfing champion.  Nat Young was 
severely beaten after a dispute that began as an argument over who had priority on a 
wave.  These two images would help a non-surfer understand the stakes involved 
when surfers compete for waves.  The waves themselves are an extraordinary 
resource lying at the centre of many surfers’ lives.  The high value many surfers 
place on surfing means that competition for crowded waves can evoke strong emo-
tions.  At its worst, this competition can escalate to serious assaults such as that 
suffered by Nat Young.   
 
Surfing is no longer the idiosyncratic pursuit of a small counterculture.  In fact, the 
popularity of surfing has exploded to the point where it is not only within the main-
stream, it is big business.1  And while the number of surfers continues to increase, 
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1
 For example, roughly 900,000 people (out of a population of approximately 20 million) surf regularly 
in Australia alone.  See Brian Fitzgerald and Geoffrey Clark (eds), ‘Law of the Surf Forum Number 2’ 
(2002) 6 Southern Cross University Law Review 318, 324 (commentary by Melanie Mott) (hereinafter 
Surf Forum 2).  Moreover, the United States surf equipment and apparel industry generates approxi-
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the number of surf breaks remains constant.  Thus, crowding and conflict have 
increased.  Publicity surrounding high profile incidents, such as the assault on Nat 
Young, have started to change the image of surfing.2  This new image of surfers has 
even reached Hollywood.  Two recent movies, Blue Crush and Point Break, both 
included scenes of violence in the surf. 
 
Despite the popularity of surfing and the high value that surfers place on waves, 
there is almost no state intervention in how waves are distributed among surfers.  In 
the place of state intervention, surfers have developed a complicated set of norms or 
rules that govern behaviour in the surf and priority over the waves.  This article 
considers the informal norms that govern surfing.  These norms offer a rich and 
important case study in how a valuable resource can be shared between millions of 
people with no state intervention and relatively little conflict. 
 
In Part II of this article, I explain the basics of surfing and review the resource 
management issues facing the surfing community.  In Part III, I briefly review some 
of the literature about social norms and identify theoretical issues that my case 
study may help illuminate.  Part IV examines the cooperative norms of surfing in 
detail.  I find that a similar set of norms has emerged around the world.  I suggest 
that these norms are directed toward efficiency and have allowed surfers to success-
fully manage their ‘commons’ despite the fact that the surf community as a whole is 
very large and is not close-knit. 
 
In Part V, I turn to the darker side of surf culture, surfer localism.  Localism in-
volves an alternative set of norms that have arisen at certain surf breaks around the 
world.  At it worst, localism seeks the outright exclusion, through violence, of non-
local surfers.  Part VI investigates responses to localism.  These responses follow 
some of the strategies suggested by commentators on norms and the law.  These 
include attempts to reinforce the cooperative norms of surfing, the enforcement of 
existing criminal law and an attempt to pass a law criminalising surfer localism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                 
mately $1.8 billion dollars in revenue every year.  See Duncan Campbell, ‘Surf Wars Hit California’, 
Guardian Unlimited, 12 March 2002, 
<http:www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,7792,666039,00.html> at 24 October 2003. 
2
 See, for example, Paul McHugh, ‘Surfing’s Scary Wave: ‘Localism’ Intensifying at Ocean Breaks’, The 
San Francisco Chronicle, 15 May 2003, C11; Duncan Campbell, ‘California Police Step in to Stop Surf 
Wars’, The Guardian, 10 June 2002, 14. 
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II SURFING AND THE STRANGE         
ECONOMICS OF THE SURFERS’ COMMONS                                                                                
 
A So what is this surfing thing anyway? 
A grasp of the basics of surfing is essential before one can understand surfing’s 
unwritten norms.  Most of the norms of surfing are expressed in ‘surf-speak’. Thus, 
this subpart contains an introduction to surfing and surfing terminology.  This 
subpart should be skipped by any reader already familiar with the sport. 
 
The first thing to note, is that surfers prefer to ride along the sheer face of a wave as 
it breaks behind them.  By riding along the face of the wave, surfers reach greater 
speeds and harness more of the wave’s power than simply riding the ‘whitewater’ 
or ‘foam’ of a wave that has already broken.  A ride is usually more thrilling if the 
surfer is as close as possible to the breaking section (or ‘curl’) of the wave as he or 
she rides.  The surfer closest to the breaking section of a wave is said to be on the 
‘inside’.3 
 
The spot at which a breaking wave can first be caught is called the ‘peak’ or ‘take-
off zone’.  A wave is known as a ‘right’ or a ‘left’ depending on the direction in 
which it is ridden from the peak.4  Some peaks offer both lefts and rights while 
others only break in a single direction.  On a right breaking wave the surfer furthest 
to the left would be on the ‘inside’ and visa-versa.   The group of surfers congre-
gated in the area around the take-off zone or peak is often called the ‘lineup’. 
 
Surfing breaks can be divided into two further categories.  These are point breaks 
and beach breaks.  Point breaks, as the name suggests, break at points.  Most point 
breaks break over a rock shelf or a reef.  These breaks usually have a single peak 
with a stable position.  Thus, the competition for waves tends to be far more intense 
and focused at point breaks because surfers must jostle for position within a small 
area.  Beach breaks tend to have multiple and ‘shifting’ peaks.  This means that 
surfers at beach beaks do not have to congregate in a single small area to compete 
for waves.  Generally, point breaks offer better and longer rides than beach breaks.5   
 
Sometimes a long ‘section’ of a wave will break all at once making it difficult for a 
surfer to ride along the face.  Skilled surfers can deal with this problem by racing 
along the face and beating the section before it breaks or by moving down the face 
and around the front of the broken ‘section’.  This would be called ‘making the 
section’.   
 
                                                        
3
 As will be explained in Part IV, a central norm of surfing is that the surfer on the inside has priority 
over a wave. 
4
 The direction is determined from the perspective of looking from the wave toward the shore. 
5
 For a more detailed description (and excellent diagrams) of the mechanics of surfing and surf breaks 
see Kent Pearson, Surfing Subcultures of Australia and New Zealand (1979) 134-40. 
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Modern surfers ride a variety of different surf-craft.  The differences between these 
craft (and the status of those who ride them) are relevant to understanding surfing 
norms.  Most surfers ride standing up on fibreglass surfboards.  These surfboards 
are divided into ‘shortboards’ and ‘longboards’.  Shortboards allow more manoeu-
vrability and are better suited to steep, powerful waves.  Longboards are less ma-
noeuvrable but are better suited to riding gently breaking (or ‘mushy’) waves.  As 
they have more flotation and paddle speed, longboards also allow surfers to catch 
waves further out from shore.  Thus, many surfers feel that longboards can offer an 
unfair advantage in the competition for waves.6 
 
Other surfers ride bodyboards, surf-kayaks and wave-skis.  Bodyboards are small 
foam boards and are usually ridden prone.  Wave-skis and surf-kayaks have much 
greater paddle speed than all other surf craft.  As was the case with longboarders, 
this natural advantage can create tension and conflict.7  Bodyboarders and wave-ski 
riders are often considered to have lower status than those who ride more traditional 
surfboards.8 
 
Some other terms of surf slang are worth knowing.  Young surfers are often called 
‘grommets’ or ‘groms’.  Incompetent surfers are derided as ‘kooks’.  Finally, don’t 
forget that surfing is a lot of fun. 
 
B The Economics of the Surfers’ Commons 
Hardin’s classic fable of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ involved the over-grazing of 
a communal pasture.9  According to Hardin’s story, livestock owners will always 
have an individual incentive to add to their herds even if the pressure caused by the 
additional animals will reduce the output of the community as a whole.10  This 
analysis can be generalised to other common resources, such as fisheries or national 
parks, because individuals will have incentives to overuse any resource open to the 
public.11  Moreover, individuals may not have an incentive to invest in an open 
resource if the public at large will snag the benefits of this investment.12  Thus, 
common resources may suffer from both overuse and under-investment leading to 
waste and inefficiency. 
 
The surfers’ commons is different from a fishery or a communal pasture, however.  
In fact, it is not even immediately obvious if there is such a thing as ‘over-surfing’.  
Over-fishing today can lead to no fish tomorrow.  Similarly, over-grazing can cause 
                                                        
6
 See Part IV(B)(1). 
7
 See ibid. 
8
 See Part V(B). 
9
 See Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 162 Science 1243, partially reprinted in 
Robert C Ellickson, Carol M Rose and Bruce A Ackerman (eds), Perspectives on Property Law (2nd ed, 
1995) 132. 
10
 See ibid. 
11
 Ibid 134. 
12
 See Carol Rose, ‘The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property’ 
(1986) 53 University of Chicago Law Review 711, 712. 
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a pasture to be almost useless for future seasons.  In contrast, today’s surfers cannot 
change tomorrow’s waves.  There may be good surf tomorrow no matter how 
crowded the waves were last week.  Thus, overcrowding of a surf break does not 
have the kind of long-term consequences caused by overuse of other resources. 
 
Similarly, there is no threat of under-investment in the surfers’ commons.  Surfers 
are at the mercy of geography and meteorology.  The size and direction of swell and 
the physical features of the coast facing the swell determine the number and quality 
of waves available.  Thus, there is very little surfers can do to improve the quality 
of surf breaks.  Artificial reefs have created a small number of new surf breaks.13  
However, these breaks are very expensive and it is unlikely that the development of 
artificial breaks will play a significant role in surfing’s future.14  Essentially, the 
number of waves available is independent of how the resource is managed. 
 
So, how can surfers overuse or under-invest in their commons?  The key to answer-
ing this question is the premise that the most efficient way to manage a surf break is 
to ensure that as many waves as possible are surfed and that each of these waves is 
surfed by a single surfer.  Obviously, any wave that goes unsurfed is wasted.  Also, 
only one person should ride each wave.  It is far less enjoyable to share a wave as 
the presence of another surfer limits the ability to manoeuvre.15  More importantly, 
the risk of collision makes sharing waves unsafe.  Thus, there is a consensus among 
surfers that only one person should ride each wave.  In fact, this is probably surf-
ing’s most universal norm.16  Overall, surfers will under-use their commons when-
ever they waste an available wave and they will overuse their commons whenever 
more than one surfer rides a wave. 
 
Surfing can be considered a kind of mixed-motive game.  Mixed-motive games are 
games in which the players have a common interest in coordination even though 
they have some conflicting interests.17  In a simple coordination game the players 
have an interest in coordinating their behaviour.18  For example, drivers have an 
interest in coordinating which side of the road to drive on.  Drivers may not care 
which side of the road is chosen as long as all drivers coordinate and choose the 
same side.  Mixed-motive games add an element of conflict to a coordination game.   
 
The Hawk-Dove game is an example of a mixed-motive game that is useful for 
modelling the choices faced by surfers.  McAdams presents the following example 
of a Hawk-Dove game.  In the game ‘the most desirable outcome comes from 
                                                        
13
 See Nat Young, ‘Surf Rage’ in Nat Young (ed), Surf Rage (2000) 208, 212-214. 
14
 The artificial reef at Cottestloe in Australia cost approximately US$1 million.  See ibid.  Moreover, the 
artificial reef (which happens to be the closest surf break to my Australian home) rarely breaks well and 
local surfers generally consider it to be a failure. 
15
 Midget Farrelly, a world surfing champion in the 1960s, wrote ‘if there is another fellow on the wave I 
have to think about five things - myself, the board, the wave, him and his board. . . . [i]t just clutters 
things up and is no fun at all.’ Midget Farrelly, The Surfing Life (1965) 17-18. 
16
 See Part IV(A)(1). 
17
 See Richard H McAdams, ‘A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law’ (2000) 86 Virginia Law Review 
1649, 1672-76. 
18
 Ibid 1654-58. 
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playing Hawk against Dove (here providing a utility of 2), followed by playing 
Dove against Dove (1), playing Dove against Hawk (0), and playing Hawk against 
Hawk (-2).’19  Figure 1 illustrates this game. 
 
-------------------------- 
 Dove Hawk 
-------------------------- 
Dove 1 , 1 0 , 2 
-------------------------- 
Hawk 2 , 0   -2 , -2 
-------------------------- 
 Figure 1 
 
 
Surfing can be modelled as a Hawk-Dove game.20  Suppose two surfers are in 
position to catch a wave.  Each has the option of catching the wave or letting it pass.  
We can assume that if both surfers catch the wave then they risk collision and injury 
and thus will receive a negative payoff (here providing utility of -4).  If both surfers 
let the wave pass then neither will receive any payoff.  If one surfer catches the 
wave while the other lets it pass then the successful surfer gets a positive payoff 
(here 3).  Figure 2 illustrates this game.21 
 
--------------------------- 
 Pass   Catch 
--------------------------- 
Pass      0 , 0        0 , 3 
--------------------------- 
Catch    3 , 0       -4 , -4 
--------------------------- 
 Figure 2 
 
 
This payoff matrix gives the players an incentive to coordinate to ensure that they 
do not both play Hawk and catch the wave.  Moreover, because the players receive 
no payoff from passing, the most efficient strategy is for one player to catch the 
wave while the other passes.  Thus, surfers will benefit from norms that enable 
them to determine when they should pass and when they should catch the wave.  In 
Part IV, I discuss the central drop-in norm of surfing.  This norm accomplishes this 
exact task. 
                                                        
19
 Ibid 1674. 
20
 Feedback from Jeffrey Rachlinsky convinced me that surfing is better modelled as a Hawk-Dove game 
than as a prisoner’s dilemma game.  Surfing is more like a Hawk-Dove game because of the common 
interest in coordination (to ensure one surfer per wave). 
21
 Note that there is no dominant strategy in a Hawk-Dove game like this.  In a prisoner’s dilemma game 
the dominant strategy for both players is to defect.  In a Hawk-Dove game, however, there is no domi-
nant strategy as it is better to play Dove (pass) against Hawk (catch) but it is better to play Hawk (catch) 
against Dove (pass). 
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Although Figure 2 is a good model for surfing, it is a tremendous simplification.  
Some of the more obvious complications are worth discussing.  First, not every 
surfer’s payoff schedule will be the same.  For example, a particularly skilled surfer 
may be more capable of avoiding a wipe-out or collision while sharing a wave.22  
Thus, some surfers may have a positive payoff from ‘Catch’ even when the other 
surfer catches the wave.  Figure 3 illustrates a game involving such a surfer. 
 
--------------------------- 
 Pass   Catch 
--------------------------- 
Pass      0 , 0        0 , 3 
--------------------------- 
Catch    3 , 0       1 , -2 
--------------------------- 
 Figure 3 
 
 
In the game illustrated by Figure 3, ‘Catch’ is the dominant strategy for one of the 
surfers.  Thus, in a one-shot game this surfer will always catch the wave even 
though this can lead to a negative global utility.  Sanctions offer a solution to this 
problem.  Serious sanctions for playing ‘Catch’ against ‘Catch’ could ensure that 
this is no longer a dominant strategy for some surfers.23     
 
There are two other obvious complications.  First, surfing usually involves more 
than two ‘players’.  Thus, any norm that determines which surfer should play 
‘Catch’ may need to designate a single surfer out of a large group.  Second, the 
surfing game is an iterated game with multiple rounds.  If surfing were a two-player 
game then multiple iterations could provide a simple solution of taking turns.  The 
solution of taking turns becomes more difficult to administer with a larger number 
of players, however. 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that severe overcrowding can lead to inefficiencies even 
if every surfer tries to observe cooperative norms.  This is because surfers who are 
simply paddling around can still get in the way of the surfer actually riding a wave 
and ruin the ride or cause a dangerous collision.24  Obviously, there is some upper 
limit to how many surfers can surf a break safely.25  If thousands of surfers tried to 
surf at a single break there simply wouldn’t be room to move around.  Thus, surfers 
may need to develop norms dealing specifically with overcrowding.  
 
                                                        
22
 This will be especially likely on gently breaking waves with wide shoulders. 
23
 Surfers’ sanctioning behaviour is discussed in Part IV(C).  
24
 Surfers’ norms relating to avoiding collisions are discussed at Part IV(A). 
25
 See Part V(G)(3). 
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III SOCIAL NORMS 
 
In recent years, legal researchers have devoted a lot of attention to the role of social 
norms and the relationship between norms and law.26  This literature includes a 
diverse sample of case studies as well as more theoretical work.  There are case 
studies of the norms among ranchers, the norms of feuding and revenge, norms 
within the diamond industry, norms among scientists and norms among sumo 
wrestlers in Japan.27  This article is intended to add another case study to the litera-
ture.  It is hoped that this case study will both be interesting on its own and will 
provide a few helpful insights for the more abstract questions about social norms. 
 
A Definitions and theoretical issues 
The literature discussing social norms is diffuse and researchers have not settled on 
a single definition of ‘social norm’.28  Nevertheless, many common threads emerge.  
First, social norms are more than just regularities in behaviour.  Social norms are 
usually considered to be obligations in some sense.  Robert Cooter provides the 
following useful illustration: ‘[M]en take off their hats when they enter a furnace 
room or a church.  Taking off your hat to escape the heat is different from taking off 
your hat to satisfy an obligation.  The former is a regularity and the latter is a 
norm.’29 
 
Perhaps the best way to distinguish norms from mere regularities is to distinguish 
norms on the basis of sanctions.30  On this view, a norm is more than a regularity 
because the violation of a norm generates a negative affect among those who know 
about the norm and this may be accompanied by sanctions.  For example, if we see 
someone wearing a hat in a hot room we will simply wonder why he doesn’t make 
                                                        
26
 See Andrew J Chappel, ‘Bringing Cultural Practice into Law: Ritual and Social Norms Jurisprudence’ 
(2003) 43 Santa Clara Law Review 389, 389 n1 (citing numerous law review articles and books pub-
lished since 1990 that discuss social norms); Robert C Ellickson, ‘Law and Economics Discovers Social 
Norms’ (1998) 27 Journal of Legal Studies 537, 543 (‘[I]n the mid-1990s norms became one of the 
hottest topics in the legal academy.’).  
27
 See Luc Faucher, Ron Mallon, Daniel Nazer, Shaun Nichols, Aaron Ruby, Stephen Stich and Jonathon 
Weinberg, ‘The Baby in the Lab-coat; Why Child Development is an Inadequate Model for Understand-
ing the Development of Science’ in Peter Carruthers, Stephen Stich and Michael Siegal (eds), The 
Cognitive Basis of Science (2002) 335, 343-48 (discussing science as a norm-governed activity); Arti 
Kaur Rai, ‘Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science’ 
(1999) 94 Northwestern University Law Review 77; Mark West, ‘Legal Rules and Social Norms in 
Japan’s Secret World of Sumo’ (1997) 26 Journal of Legal Studies 165; Lisa Bernstein, ‘Opting Out of 
the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry’ (1992) 21 Journal of Legal 
Studies 115; Robert C Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (1991) 1-123 
(presenting a detailed case study of social norms among ranchers and other neighbours in California’s 
Shasta County); Jon Elster, ‘Norms of Revenge’ (1990) 100 Ethics 862. 
28
 See Ellickson, above n 26, 549 (‘The waters are so muddy that many writers on norms feel compelled 
to start by proffering their own definition of norm.’). 
29
 Robert D Cooter, ‘Decentralised Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicat-
ing the New Law Merchant’ (1996) 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1643, 1656 (1996) 
(footnote omitted). 
30
 This is essentially the approach followed in Ellickson, above n 27, 123-32. 
2004 The Tragicomedy of the Surfers’ Commons  663     
 
himself more comfortable.  In contrast, if the same man wears a hat in church he 
will annoy onlookers and may encounter disapproving looks, muttering or a pointed 
request to remove his hat. 
 
A variety of actors can administer sanctions.  We can distinguish first, second and 
third-party sanctions.31  First-party sanctions are administered by the primary actor 
himself or herself.  Second-party sanctions are administered by the person acted 
upon and third-party sanctions are administered by other individuals or groups.  For 
example, if a person cuts in line he may feel personal guilt (a first-party sanction), 
be yelled at by someone who had priority in the line (a second-party sanction) or be 
the subject of negative gossip by his peer group (a third-party sanction).   
 
Norms are more powerful than individual self-help.  This is because much of the 
enforcement power of norms comes from first and third-party sanctions.   A norm 
violation ‘typically provokes negative affect and an inclination to sanction or punish 
[even] among members of the community who are not directly involved or 
harmed.’32  This suggests that the enforcement of norms is not always based on a 
selfish individual motivation.  Moreover, people can internalize norms and choose 
to abide by them even when external sanctions are unlikely.33  Thus, a norm can be 
successful even when second and third-party sanctions are rare. Nevertheless, a 
norm violation will authorise third-party sanctions (that may be as mild as disap-
proving looks). 
 
The theoretical work on norms and law has addressed a number of issues such as 
the best way to define social norms, the origins of social norms, the efficiency of 
social norms and how social norms can be changed.34  This case study will address 
a few of these issues.  In particular, I will look at whether surfing norms are effi-
cient,35 the rationality of sanctioning behaviour,36 and how norms can be deliber-
ately manipulated to influence public policy.37 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
31
 Ibid 131. 
32
 Faucher, above n 27, 345. 
33
 See generally, Amitai Etzioni, ‘Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion, and History’ (2000) 34 Law 
and Society Review 157 (arguing that most of the power of social norms comes from internalisation and 
first-party based incentives).  
34
 See, for example, Ellickson, above n 27, 124-286 (developing a taxonomy of social norms and arguing 
that many social norms are efficient); Robert Cooter, ‘The Normative Failure Theory of Law’ (1997) 82 
Cornell Law Review 947 (discussing formation and change of social norms); Richard H McAdams, ‘The 
Origin, Development and Regulation of Norms’ (1997) 96 Michigan Law Review 338; Eric A Posner, 
‘Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law’ (1998) 27 Journal of Legal Studies 765 
(discussing how norms can be changed). 
35
 See Part IV(D). 
36
 See Part V(G)(2). 
37
 See Part VI(A). 
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B A methodological aside 
Bob Ellickson is not a rancher and Mark West is not a sumo wrestler.  I am a surfer, 
however.  Thus, my own experiences are part of the source material for this article.  
Thankfully, I was also able to draw upon a rich variety of primary material about 
surfing norms.  These include published interviews with surfers, the surfing com-
munity’s own educational materials about surf etiquette, reported cases and socio-
logical research about surfers.  I also conducted a small number of interviews 
myself.  Thus, I feel confident that my factual conclusions about surfing norms are 
based on a sufficiently broad range of evidence. 
 
My normative conclusions raise a more serious methodological concern, however.  
Much of this article discusses the ‘problem’ of localism and attempted responses to 
it.38  Some surfers do not believe that localism is a problem.39  Other surfers, while 
accepting that localism has negative aspects, believe that localism also has signifi-
cant virtues.40  I believe that anything more forceful than the mildest form of local-
ism41 is pernicious.  I will attempt to justify this view, but the reader should note 
that I have had some negative personal experiences with localism.  Thus, I cannot 
claim to be a fully unbiased observer. 
  
IV SURFING NORMS (A COMEDY OF THE COMMONS?)42 
 
This part looks at the cooperative norms of surfing.  Surfers use a variety of terms 
to describe these norms.  These include the ‘Surfriders Code’43, the ‘Surfers Code 
of Ethics’44 and the ‘Tribal Law of Surfing’.45  These norms have been a massive 
success story and have allowed many millions of people to share a valued resource 
with almost no state intervention and relatively little serious conflict.  Surfing 
norms are usually unwritten.46  Some ‘codifications’ of surfing norms are available, 
                                                        
38
 See Parts V-VI. 
39
 See, for example, Fred Pawle, ‘The Australian Way’, in Nat Young (ed) Surf Rage (2000) 85, 85. 
40
 See, for example, Steve Barilotti, Localism Works (2003) 
<http://surfermag.com/magazine/archivedissues/locismwrks> at 28 April 2004. 
41
 I describe ‘mild localism’ in Part V(A). 
42
 I use the term ‘Comedy of the Commons’ in a sense borrowed from Carol Rose.  Rose uses ‘comedy’ 
in ‘the classical sense of a story with a happy outcome.’  Rose, above n 12, 723.  Thus, a ‘comedy of the 
commons’ is a story of a successfully managed commons. 
43
 See Brian Fitzgerald and Geoffrey Clark (eds), ‘Law of the Surf Forum’ (2001) 5 Southern Cross 
University Law Review 228, 242 (showing a reproduction of a poster created by the Surfrider Foundation 
of Australia) (hereinafter Surf Forum 1). 
44
 See NEsurf, Surfers Code of Ethics <http://www.nesurf.com/Articles/Ettiquette/etiquette.html> (last 
visited 17 October 2003) (hereinafter Surfers Code of Ethics) (NEsurf is a website serving the surf 
community of the north-eastern United States.  Visitors are encouraged to print out the Surfers Code of 
Ethics and ‘distribute it to as many people as you can.’  Ibid). 
45
 See Nat Young (ed) Surf Rage (2000) 8 (reproducing a plaque which is fixed near a surf break in 
Margaret River in Western Australia). 
46
 See Surf Forum 2, above n 1, 349-50 (commentary by Brian Fitzgerald & Geoffrey Clark) (noting that 
surf norms ‘have been passed down through generations of surfers, mentors and/or gurus’). 
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however.47  These codifications show that basic surfing norms are almost identical 
around the world. 
 
In this Part, I discuss the different layers of surfing norms.  First, I discuss the more 
precise norms of surfing.  These norms apply at almost all surf breaks.  As Yale 
Law School’s surfing Dean told me, these norms comprise the ‘universal implied 
jurisprudence’ of surfing.48  Second, I discuss some of the more variable and impre-
cise surfing norms.  These include norms governing whether surfers should try to 
share waves equitably.  Third, I focus on the issue of sanctions in the surf.  Finally, 
I consider how my findings relate to theoretical concerns about social norms. 
 
A Rules of the road 
This subpart reviews the more clear-cut surfing norms.  These norms are the general 
‘rules of the road’ that apply at almost all surf breaks.  These norms can be chal-
lenging to apply as they can involve split second judgments about many factors 
such as other surfers’ intentions and about how a wave is going to break.  Even 
though these rules can be difficult to apply, however, they still give fairly determi-
nate answers as to how surfers should behave.  Thus, if surfers are given the same 
information about a situation they will usually agree on how to apply these norms.  
I begin by discussing the most essential of these norms. 
 
1 Three fundamental norms 
Of the concrete norms of surfing, three in particular stand out as fundamental and 
universal.  These norms govern which surfer has priority over a wave and safety 
issues.  ‘The most basic rule is that one surfer should not ‘drop in’ on another 
surfer.’49  A surfer ‘drops in’ when he or she takes off on a wave where another 
surfer has priority.  A surfer has priority if he or she is already riding the wave.50  If 
no surfer is yet riding the wave, the surfer further on the inside (closest to the break-
ing section of the wave) has the right of way.51  The rule against dropping in implies 
an obligation to monitor the position of other surfers.52  Thus, whenever a surfer 
attempts to catch a wave he or she has an obligation to ensure that there is no one 
already riding the wave and no one else is about to catch the wave on the inside.  
The rule against dropping in ‘appears to be a cross cultural universal.’53 
 
At least two other basic and universal norms appear in the codifications of surf 
etiquette.  These are the ‘paddle-wide’ norm and the ‘don’t-throw-your-board’ 
                                                        
47
 See sources cited above n 44-46; Mark Jury, Surfing in Southern Africa (1989) 116. 
48
 Dean Anthony Kronman, Personal communication February 2004 (Dean Kronman, who grew up in 
Southern California, is a lifelong surfer). 
49
 Surf Forum 2, above n 1, 350 (commentary by Brian Fitzgerald & Geoffrey Clark). 
50
 See, for example, Surfers Code of Ethics, above n 44. 
51
 See, for example, ibid. 
52
 See, for example, Jury, above n 47, 116. 
53
 Pearson, above n 5, 141. 
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norm.54  Surfers are encouraged to paddle away from the part of the wave most 
likely to be ridden by others.  This helps prevent collisions.  At point breaks, this 
means moving further away from land and paddling around the area where waves 
break.  ‘Paddling wide’ can be more difficult at beach breaks because the location 
of the breaking waves can shift.  At beaches, surfers are encouraged to find the rips 
(where the water is sucked back out to sea) rather than paddling back out through 
the breaking waves.55 
 
Finally, surfers are encouraged not to let go of their surfboards if they are forced to 
pass through a broken wave.56  Most surfers are attached to their surfboards via a 
leg-rope.  Thus, it is often easier to dive underneath a broken wave by letting go of 
the board, swimming underneath the wave and then retrieving the board.  The 
alternative is to ‘duck-dive’ which involves holding onto the board and pushing it 
under the wave.  Duck-diving under large waves is a challenging skill to master.  
Nevertheless, surfers are expected to duck-dive because a loose board creates a 
hazard to any surfer closer toward the shore.57  Surfers generally only benefit others 
when they attempt a challenging duck-dive instead of ‘throwing’ their board.  This 
means that cooperation here only has a pay-off if other surfers reciprocate. 
 
It is worth noting that even these fundamental norms of surfing reveal some layer-
ing of norms.  For example, the central norm governing priority over a wave (the 
drop-in rule) is itself an instantiation of the even more fundamental norm directing 
that only one surfer should ride each wave.  The one-surfer-per-wave norm is so 
deeply ingrained in surfing culture that this norm does not even appear in attempted 
‘codifications’ of the rules of surfing.58  The norm is simply implicit in the drop-in 
rule. 
 
2 Additional concrete norms 
Surfers’ obligations can extend beyond following the basic rules outlined above.  
There are some additional ‘rules of the road’ governing issues such as how to pad-
dle out and signalling one’s intention to other surfers.  In this subpart, I examine 
these additional concrete norms. 
 
One only has to review Surfline’s Bill of Rights and Lefts to appreciate the com-
plexity of surf norms.59  This document is intended to educate surfers about surf 
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 See, for example, Young, above n 45 (reproducing the ‘Tribal Law of Surfing’ plaque). 
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‘NEVER THROW YOUR BOARD’). 
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at 28 April 2004 (noting that if you let go of your board ‘any surfer within 10 or more yards, particularly 
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 See sources cited above n 44-46. 
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 See Bill of Rights, above n 57.  Surfline is one of the world’s most popular surfing websites averaging 
over one million unique hits per month.  See Telephone interview with Marcus Sanders (8 March 2004) 
(on file with author) (Marcus Sanders is an editor at Surfline). 
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norms and to help them know what to expect while surfing.60  While the ‘Bill’ only 
provides ten general rules, the details of each rule are explained with at least a full 
page of text creating a large document. 
 
Thus, before reviewing more norms, it is worth asking the following question: can 
surfers really be expected to know and follow such a detailed set of rules?  This 
question is pertinent because empirical evidence suggests that ordinary surfers are 
unlikely to articulate surfing norms in such detail.  Stephen Kuhn asked Australian 
surfers to name five ‘laws of the surf.’61  Kuhn found that most surfers could only 
name two or three ‘laws’.62  In a previous work, I endorsed the view that norms 
must be common knowledge in the sense that ‘[m]ore or less everyone knows them 
and more or less everyone knows that everyone knows them.’63  This view of 
norms, when combined with the results of Kuhn’s study, suggests that any complex 
picture of surf norms (such as that found in Surfline’s Bill of Rights and Lefts) must 
be inaccurate because its complexity is inconsistent with the simple picture pre-
sented by individual surfers.   
 
I think this conclusion can be avoided by noting that ‘[a] rule can exist even though 
the people influenced by the rule are unable to articulate it in an aspirational state-
ment.’64  In fact, Kuhn’s study supports this.  Although each surfer tended to name 
few norms, Kuhn’s subjects identified a large number of total norms.65  Kuhn sug-
gests that ‘from the responses, there appears to be about 15 or 20 rules of the surf.’66  
Thus, the complex picture of surfing norms seems to be accurate. So, having justi-
fied the claim that surfing norms are complex, let’s turn to the norms themselves.  I 
shall review the following five concrete norms: 
 
1. Give way to the person paddling out; 
2. Do not engage in ‘pre-emptive paddling’; 
3. Indicate your intentions to other surfers; 
4.  Ride any wave offered to you by other surfers; 
5. Pick the right surf spot for your ability. 
 
These norms complement the norms outlined in the preceding subpart. 
 
The first of these additional norms requires the surfer riding a wave to give way to a 
surfer paddling out.67  The surfer riding the wave generally has more speed and 
manoeuvrability than the surfer lying prone on his or her board.  Thus, if a collision 
is imminent the surfer on the wave is better able to avoid it.68  This rule is not 
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 See Telephone interview with Marcus Sanders (8 March 2004). 
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 Surf Forum 2, above n 1, 334 (commentary by Stephen Kuhn). 
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 Faucher, above n 27, 345. 
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 Ibid 334. 
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necessarily inconsistent with the ‘paddle-wide’ rule outlined above.  The paddling 
surfer is still obliged to try to avoid creating the possibility of a collision in the first 
place.  If the paddling surfer fails in this task (because of the changeability of surf 
conditions, this can happen to the most careful surfer) then the surfer on the wave 
should avoid the paddling surfer.  Nevertheless, a surfer should not ignore the 
paddle-wide rule because ‘not all surfers in the water have the skill or inclination to 
avoid your prone board and body floating up into their paths.’69 
 
The rule against pre-emptive paddling illustrates the potential complexity of the 
drop-in rule.  Suppose surfer A is riding a wave that is about to have a large section 
break at once.  If the breaking section is large enough, A will almost certainly wipe 
out or get caught behind the section.  This means that surfer B, sitting further along, 
can take off on the wave without dropping in on A.  Whether B has dropped in will 
depend on whether A could have ‘made the section’ and continued along the face of 
the wave past B.  This is determined by two factors.  These factors are: (1) the size 
of the breaking section; and (2) A’s skill.  Thus, B is faced with an instantaneous 
and complicated task of judging whether A is likely to make the section.  As part of 
this task involves judging A’s ability, an incorrect decision (at least from A’s per-
spective) is especially likely to cause resentment. 
 
This situation is made even more complicated (if that seemed possible) by the fact 
that B can ruin things for A simply by paddling for the wave.  This gives us pre-
emptive paddling: 
 
Surfer A is hurtling down the line from a long way back, and Surfer B - 
figuring A won’t make the section - begins to paddle into the wave.  As A 
approaches, B pulls back; but his paddling efforts cause the wave to crum-
ble and break in front of A.  Result, A wipes out or is caught behind, and 
the wave peels off unridden.  Bad move, B.70 
 
Pre-emptive paddling is a common problem.71  Moreover, as avoiding it requires 
instant and difficult judgment, it can easily become a topic of dispute among surf-
ers.72 
 
Surfers are obliged to make their intentions clear.  This usually involves ‘calling’ 
out whether one intends to catch a wave and which direction one intends to ride it.73  
Often a wave can be ridden either right or left and this makes calling especially 
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 Bill of Rights, above n 57 (discussing rule 3 ‘When paddling out, stay out of the way of riders on the 
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important.  For example, surfer A may have priority over B if A intends to go right.  
If A goes left, however, then B is free to ride the wave right.  B will be annoyed if 
he defers to A’s priority and then watches A head off in the other direction.  If A 
had communicated his intention, then B could also have ridden the wave.  Simi-
larly, if a surfer with priority decides to abandon a wave he or she should yell out 
something like ‘go for it!’ to the other surfers so they know the wave is available.   
 
The preceding discussion may make it seem that A and B could both have priority 
under the drop-in rule if they intend to ride toward the other surfer (as they would 
both be ‘inside’ from the perspective of their chosen direction).  In this situation the 
surfer closest to the peak always has priority and can choose his or her direction.74  
This provides another example of the potential complexity of surfing’s central drop-
in norm. 
 
The fourth norm is a corollary of the norm favouring communication.  If surfers are 
informally sharing waves then a surfer may find himself ‘called on’ to a wave by 
other surfers.  Essentially, this means the group has allocated this wave to that 
surfer.  This is most likely to occur at breaks with established groups of locals but it 
could occur at any break.  In this situation, a surfer would be well advised to try to 
ride the wave, no matter how challenging.  Otherwise, the surfer is likely to find his 
or her status decline and have his or her share of the waves dry up.  As surf journal-
ist DC Green observes: ‘[N]ever, ever pull back when called into a wave. . . . 
[b]etter by far to plunge over the falls and get totally smashed than be condemned 
forevermore by the locals . . . .’75 
 
The final norm encourages surfers to be sensible about where they surf.  The norm 
states that surfers should surf at breaks commensurate with their ability.76  A begin-
ner can endanger himself or others by paddling out into large or otherwise challeng-
ing waves.  A beginner is likely to encounter resentment if he or she surfs at a 
crowded and challenging break because the beginner is more likely to violate (in-
tentionally or not) the rules of the road.77  Thus, this norm is a meta-norm telling 
surfers to choose breaks where they will have enough skill to observe the other 
norms of surfing. 
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 See Surfers Code of Ethics, above n 44 (noting that a surfer is ‘not entitled to cross under the peak to 
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B Imprecise and abstract norms 
Surfers will generally agree on how to apply the norms discussed so far.  Thus, any 
surfer arriving at a new break will know that, at a minimum, he or she has to ob-
serve those norms.  Nevertheless, any surfer arriving at a new break will still feel 
uncertainty about the local norms.  For example, the visitor might encounter vary-
ing norms governing the balance between sharing and aggressive competition for 
waves.  Other norms relate to the phenomenon of ‘localism’.  These norms regulate 
the relationship between locals and visiting surfers.  Surfers also promote respect-
based norms that seem so abstract that they do not direct any particular conduct. 
 
Localism norms are very important to visitors because locals may even use violence 
to intimidate visiting surfers.78  Localism is discussed separately in Part V.  This 
subpart focuses on the variation in the competitiveness of surf breaks and on ab-
stract surfing norms. 
 
1 Norms governing competition and sharing 
The following norms regulate competition and sharing and can be found at some 
surf breaks and in some codifications of surfing etiquette: 
 
1. Share waves and take turns; 
2. Do not ‘snake’; 
3. Choose a break that suits your ‘attitude’; 
4. Do not abuse your surfing advantages. 
 
The first norm simply encourages sharing.  This norm states that surfers should not 
‘hog’ the waves (take more than one’s fair share).79  This is a norm that is hard to 
enforce.  If a surfer is skilled at competing for waves he or she can usually manoeu-
vre inside other surfers and get priority over a wave even if the other surfers have 
been waiting longer.  Depending on the break, this can breed resentment and could 
eventually lead to dropping in or other conflict.  At some breaks intense competi-
tion for waves may be tolerated.  At other breaks, an informal sharing regime can 
emerge.80  This makes it very difficult to judge when a surfer violates a sharing 
norm.  Marcus Sanders, an editor at Surfline, said ‘the hard thing is knowing when 
someone is taking too much – a drop in is a drop in – but when someone’s just 
ridden 14 waves then maybe they don’t have priority any more.’81 
 
The variation among surfers’ attitudes to sharing can be seen in the two different 
versions of their prohibition of ‘snaking’.  One definition of snaking holds that 
snaking is deliberately obstructing another surfer as he or she paddles for a wave.  
Another definition of snaking suggests that snaking is a violation of a sharing norm.  
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A break is likely to be more competitive if only the first version of the ‘snaking’ 
norm is active. 
  
Under the first definition, a ‘snake’ occurs if: (1) surfers A and B are both paddling 
for a wave; (2) A is further inside and has priority; and (3) B paddles across and 
directly in front of A preventing A from being able to catch the wave (but still 
enabling B to catch the wave).82  Under this definition, a snake occurs when B 
deliberately gets in A’s way. Snaking is also defined as follows:   
 
Surfer A, in position and having waited his or her turn, begins to paddle 
for the wave.  Surfer B (the snake) waits until A’s focus is purely on catch-
ing the wave, then makes a quick move to the inside and takes off, claim-
ing the wave.  If both surfers end up riding, it appears A has dropped in 
and is in the wrong . . . .83 
 
Under this definition, B does not have to get in A’s way to snake.  Rather, B vio-
lates a sharing norm by racing inside A to take advantage of the drop-in rule.  This 
version of the snake norm is harder to enforce because it is difficult to determine if 
someone raced inside or simply had priority. 
 
The two definitions of snaking are not mutually exclusive.  Thus, snaking could be 
thought to cover both categories of behaviour.  Nevertheless, each codification of 
surfing norms I have seen includes only one or the other definition.  Under either 
definition, snaking rarely occurs by accident.84  This means that snaking is highly 
likely to antagonise its victim.  Also, snaking requires skill so it is more likely to be 
practiced by talented and aggressive surfers.  Thus, the presence of snaking behav-
iour is a good indicator that a particular surfing location is a highly competitive 
environment. 
 
The preceding discussion shows that some lineups are more competitive and ag-
gressive than others.  Thus, surfers should pick breaks that suit their ‘attitude’.85  A 
surfer can create resentment by entering a laidback lineup and proceeding to ag-
gressively compete for waves.86  Also, a laidback surfer accustomed to sharing is 
likely to be frustrated and unhappy surfing in a competitive lineup.   
 
It is also worth noting that some violations of sharing norms are treated more seri-
ously.  Resentment and conflict are especially likely if the surfer ‘hogging’ the 
waves is using an advantage other than skill.  Longboards have more flotation and 
paddle speed than shortboards.  Thus, longboarders can catch waves earlier from 
                                                        
82
 See Surfers Code of Ethics, above n 44, Young, above n 45, 8 (reproducing the ‘Tribal Law of Surf-
ing’ plaque) (both providing diagrams of this form of ‘snaking’). 
83
 Bill of Rights, above n 57. 
84
 See ibid. 
85
 See ibid (appearing as rule 1). 
86
 Surfline calls the less competitive breaks ‘Cool Zones’ and suggests that if you are a competitive 
surfer then ‘paddling out at a Cool Zone is likely to leave you feeling unsatisfied and your fellow surfers 
irritated by your competitive attitude.’  Ibid. 
 672   DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 9 NO 2 
 
further back in the lineup and they have an advantage in the competition for waves.  
Thus, ‘[t]he longboard rider should be absolutely clear that his or her craft provides 
an unfair paddling advantage which, if abused, will quickly lead to hostility from 
surfers who choose to ride shorter, more high performance equipment.’87 
 
The situation is more complicated when a surfer’s advantages are based on skill.  
Highly skilled surfers generally enjoy higher status within the lineup.88  Thus, other 
surfers are less likely to sanction a skilled surfer’s gluttony.  At the very least, other 
surfers may have to accept that ‘the best surfer’s skills may earn him or her an 
occasional extra wave, or a wider opportunity to choose the precise wave he or she 
wants.’89 
 
2 Abstract norms 
Some surfing norms are so abstract that they don’t suggest specific conduct at all.  
These norms focus on the concept of ‘respect’.  For example, the slogan ‘Give 
Respect to Get Respect’ appears prominently on many codifications of surfing 
norms.  The slogan appears in large text at the bottom of the plaque in Margaret 
River, Western Australia90 and it appears on a poster distributed in Eastern Austra-
lia.91  The slogan also appears in large text above the specific rules of ethics out-
lined on a website maintained by surfers from the New England region of the 
United States.92  Clearly, this slogan captures an idea important to surfers.  
The concept of ‘respect’ also appears in other norms.  These norms include: 
 
1. Respect elders93 
2. Respect travellers94 
3. Respect learners and beginners95 
4. Respect locals96 
5. Respect the vibe in the lineup97 
 
These ‘respect’ norms don’t give clear guidance about behaviour.  Thus, it may be 
difficult to detect and sanction violators.  In fact, since I have defined a norm as 
something that gives third parties authority to sanction violators, a highly abstract 
rule is not a norm at all if detecting violators is impossible. 
 
                                                        
87
 Ibid (discussing rule 8 ‘Don’t use your surfing advantages to abuse your fellow surfers’). 
88
 See Part V(E); Pearson, Surfing Subcultures, above n 5, 153. 
89
 Bill of Rights, above n 57. 
90
 See Young, above n 45 (reproducing the ‘Tribal Law of Surfing’ plaque). 
91
 See Surf Forum 1, above n 43, 242 (showing a reproduction of a poster created by the Surfrider 
Foundation of Australia). 
92
 See, for example, Surfers Code of Ethics, above n  44. 
93
 See Surf Forum 2, above n 1, 334 (commentary by Stephen Kuhn) (appearing as rule 10 on Kuhn’s 
list). 
94
 See ibid (appearing as rule 17). 
95
 See ibid (appearing as rule 15). 
96
 See ibid (appearing as rule 9); Bill of Rights, above n 57 (appearing as rule 5). 
97
 See Bill of Rights, above n 57 (appearing as rule 7). 
2004 The Tragicomedy of the Surfers’ Commons  673     
 
Perhaps the best way to think of surfers’ ‘respect’ norms is to see them as ‘abstract 
norms’ in the sense used by McAdams.98  McAdams points out that we use the term 
‘norm’ for both specific behavioural norms and for general expressions of sentiment 
such as ‘be a loyal friend’.99  McAdams suggests that the more specific norms can 
implement or provide meaning to the more abstract norms.100  For example, the 
specific norm ‘pick up after your dog’ may be a component of the abstract norm ‘be 
a good neighbour’.  In this way, specific norms provide the content to the abstract 
norms they instantiate.  Moreover, violators of abstract norms can be punished 
whenever they violate a behavioural norm that instantiates the abstract norm.  An 
abstract norm may provide the moral force behind a specific behavioural norm.101 
 
In the surfing context, the obligation to ‘respect’ other surfers (such as locals and 
elders) may be nothing more that the obligation to observe all the concrete norms 
outlined above.  Under this theory, the surfers’ concept of ‘respect’ provides a 
moral foundation for their other norms.  Essentially, the prominence of ‘respect’ 
talk suggests that surfers believe that their norms are more than just rules of con-
venience (like driving on the left or shaking hands with the right hand) but behav-
iours that demonstrate esteem for their fellow surfers. 
 
Some surfers resist the idea that surf norms should be given this broader moral 
significance.  For example, Australian journalist Fred Pawle says ‘I don’t go surfing 
to show respect to anyone. . . . I go out to enjoy myself, and am prepared to do it 
while causing my fellow surfers the least amount of grief.’102  Under this view, surf 
norms should be seen as simple rules of the road which allow surfers to coexist with 
a minimum of inconvenience.   
 
Pawle may also be resisting the ‘respect’ norm because he feels that some surfers 
misuse it in an attempt to get a larger share of waves.  Pawle says ‘respect is one of 
the most overused words in the English language. . . . [i]t usually means one person 
or group imposing a dubious set of standards on someone else, usually at their 
expense.’103  For example, ‘respecting locals’ may involve more than just ensuring 
that you honour the drop-in norm around locals, it may involve allowing the locals 
to catch any waves they want.104  This would give the ‘respect’ norm a meaning 
independent of the concrete norms outlined above.  Further discussion of this less 
cooperative version of the respect norm would take us into the crazy world of surfer 
localism which is reserved for Part V of this article. 
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C Sanctions 
Ellickson noted that the ranchers of Shasta County enforced their social norms 
through low cost sanctions such as negative gossip.105  In this context ‘talk is 
cheap.’106  Surfers may not have this low-cost option, however, because they fre-
quently have to deal with strangers.  Thus, the wronged surfer often has to engage 
in immediate and face to face sanctioning behaviour with an unfamiliar person.   
 
Consider the following episode of sanctioning behaviour provided by author Daniel 
Duane.  Duane wrote about returning to surfing after a long absence.  He admits 
that ‘[i]m my time away from the water I’d forgotten the code, the traffic rules.’107  
Unsurprisingly then, he soon violates the drop-in rule and ruins a wave ridden by a 
‘little Blond Apollo’ who proceeds to scream insults at him.108  Duane notes ‘his 
fury struck me as almost comical: aside from the fact that I had about fifty pounds 
on him, how could he know, in this day and age, that I didn’t have a Glock in my 
car.’109  Duane notes that there is a ‘confidence in humanity required to shout at a 
complete stranger.’110  As this confidence may be misplaced, sanctioning behaviour 
in the surf is a risky business. 
 
At this point it is worth returning to the story of Nat Young’s assault.  This narrative 
helps illustrate the operation of a variety of surf norms and shows the risks involved 
with sanctioning behaviour.  The assault took place at Angourie Point in New South 
Wales, Australia.  Nat Young and longboard rider Michael Hutchison were both 
regular surfers at the point.  There was lingering resentment between the surfers 
because Young believed that Hutchinson illegitimately used his advantages as a 
longboarder and ‘took off on every set wave, something that isn’t done in according 
to the rules of surfing.’111  As noted above, a violation of the share-the-waves norm 
is most likely to be resented when it is perceived to be based on an unfair surfing 
advantage such as board length.   
 
The incident itself began when Young took off on a wave despite the fact that 
another surfer had been on the inside.  This would usually violate the drop-in rule 
but Young claims that the other surfer called him onto the wave, thus giving him 
permission to ride.  Nevertheless, Hutchinson’s son Luke believed that Young had 
dropped in on this surfer and began abusing Young for violating the drop-in rule 
(despite the fact that Young hadn’t wronged Luke or Luke’s father directly).  
Young claims that Luke was ‘screaming obscenities at the top of his lungs.’112  In 
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response, Young ‘swatted him in the mouth’ to get him to shut up.113  Shortly after 
this, Luke’s father confronted Young on the beach and beat Young very severely. 
 
Thus, it appears that the assault had two origins.  First, there was the background of 
resentment between the parties based on an alleged violation of the share-the-waves 
norm.  Second, there was a fuse provided by the son’s allegedly unjustified sanc-
tioning behaviour and Young’s assault on the son in response.  Thankfully, such 
assaults are not common.  Nevertheless, the possibility of such assaults ensures that, 
from an individual perspective, surfing norms are costly to maintain.  Thus, surfing 
norms provide a good example of the willingness of individuals to enforce norms 
through sanctions despite high costs. 
 
D A comedy of the commons? 
Many researchers have lauded social norms as welfare maximising and highly 
efficient.114  On this view, ‘norms solve collective action problems by encouraging 
people to do useful things that they would not do without the relevant norms.’115  In 
fact, norms can solve difficult collective action and coordination problems very 
cheaply because they apply an informal and decentralised form of social control 
rather than an expensive centralised mechanism such as formal law.  The optimistic 
view of norms has been supported by a variety of case studies.116 
 
Although the optimistic view of social norms is prevalent, some writers are scepti-
cal about the value of social norms.117  Accordingly, there are case studies provid-
ing examples of bad norms.  For example, John Elster convincingly argues that 
feuding norms are neither individually rational nor welfare maximising.118  This is 
hardly a surprise.  It seems obvious that a norm responsible for regular violent 
conflict on the basis of no more than perceived slights against honour is not welfare 
maximising.  Nevertheless, some commentators argue that feuding norms are so-
cially beneficial.119  The sheer implausibility of some of the arguments in favour of 
feuding norms120 suggests that some researchers seem compelled to argue that 
social norms are welfare maximising.  Perhaps the idea that norms are socially 
beneficial has itself become a social norm among academics?  This is too harsh, 
however, as even some of the most bullish supporters of norms accept that not all 
norms are beneficial or efficient.121 
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Overall, surfing norms strongly support the optimistic view of social norms.  These 
norms promote efficiency.  I have already discussed the efficiency promoting prop-
erties of a one-surfer-per-wave norm.122  This norm is so fundamental to surfers that 
it is rarely even explicitly mentioned.  The norm is simply implicit in the drop-in 
rule.  The drop-in rule gives priority to the surfer who is best placed to have the 
longest and most enjoyable ride.  This is because the person furthest to the inside on 
a wave is going to be able to ride it the longest.  Moreover, being ‘inside’ places the 
surfer closest to the breaking part of the wave which is also the steepest and most 
thrilling part of the wave to ride.  Thus, the drop-in rule is the most efficient way to 
implement the norm of one surfer per wave. 
 
Other norms have similar efficiency promoting features.  The paddle wide norm 
prevents waves from being wasted by paddling surfers getting in the way of riding 
surfers.  The rule against pre-emptive paddling also prevents paddling surfers from 
wasting waves.123  The norm favouring communication is also clearly directed at 
preventing waste.  Surfers have a responsibility to indicate which direction they 
intend to surf and whether they are actually going to catch waves.  This prevents 
waves being wasted simply because other surfers were unsure about their inten-
tions.   
 
Finally, the norm requiring surfers to take off whenever they are ‘called on’ to a 
wave shows a similar distain for wasting waves.  Nevertheless, although this norm 
reduces waste, it may not be welfare maximising.  Surfers may be required to hon-
our this norm even if they risk injury by taking off on a large set wave.124  Thus, the 
norm may not really benefit surfers.  Surfers sometimes appear to take their opposi-
tion to waste to excessive lengths.  Nevertheless, I believe that, overall, surfing 
norms provide very strong support for the optimistic view of norms. 
 
Surfing norms only seem partly influenced by concerns about distribution.  Equity 
plays a part in the ‘share the waves’ and ‘don’t abuse your surfing advantages’ 
norms.  Ellickson suggested that social norms governing workaday affairs are 
unlikely to be influenced by distributive considerations.125  It seems that surfing 
norms conflict with this suggestion.  This is not a serious conflict, however.  First, 
surfers do not import any external distributive concerns (i.e. you do not get more 
waves because you are poor).  Moreover, the distributive norms are trumped by 
other norms such as the drop-in rule that comprise the central rules of the road for 
surfers.  This shows that the efficiency norms are dominant.  Moreover, distributive 
norms have most force when the violator is perceived to be abusing an unfair ad-
vantage such as extra board length.  When a violator is getting extra waves because 
of skill he or she may not face any sanctions at all.126  
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Overall, the focus of surf norms is on efficiency.  Moreover, the norms work.  Surf 
norms allow for millions of people around the world to regulate their activity with 
almost no state intervention.  Violence in the surf is relatively rare despite the fact 
that surfers value waves very highly.  
 
Ellickson suggests that efficient norms are most likely to emerge among close-knit 
groups.127  Other writers follow Ellickson in placing specific emphasis on the wel-
fare maximising properties of norms developed by close-knit groups.128  Surfers, 
however, have developed a set of efficient norms despite the fact that they are not a 
close-knit group.  The global surfing community is far too vast to be considered 
close-knit.  Nevertheless, surfers around the world have developed a core set of 
norms that applies, with only minor variations, across different parts of the world.  I 
have looked at descriptions of surf norms from Eastern Australia,129 Western Aus-
tralia,130 New England,131 South Africa,132 and California.133  These accounts from 
around the world differ only in minor details and can easily be seen as describing a 
set of cross-cultural norms.  Thus, surfers show that cooperative and efficient norms 
can emerge from a large and heterogeneous community.  In fact, the norms of very 
close-knit surfing communities tend to be less cooperative.134  Some commentators 
suggest that close-knit groups may develop norms that externalise costs onto out-
siders.135  The localism norms discussed in Part V fit this pattern. 
 
The cooperative surfing norms provide support for a thesis advanced by Carol Rose.  
Rose has suggested that a tragedy of the commons is not inevitable in all circum-
stances and, furthermore, that some kinds of property are inherently public.136  Rose 
suggests some tragedies of the commons have been averted through successful 
informal management.137  She provides the examples of public pathways and navi-
gable waterways.138  Courts have even recognised the success of informal manage-
ment by recognising public property rights over such inherently public property.139  
Rose argues that ‘[f]rom a resource management perspective, a group capable of 
generating its own customs ought to be a less objectionable holder of ‘public prop-
                                                        
127
 See, for example, Ellickson, above n 27, 169. 
128
 See, for example, West, above n 27, 168 (‘This article’s central claim is that members of the Sumo 
firm, like members of other close-knit groups, have created . . . an organisational structure that maxi-
mized group welfare.’) (emphasis added). 
129
 See Surf Forum 2, above n 1, 333-34 (commentary by Stephen Kuhn); Surf Forum 1, above n 43, 242 
(showing a reproduction of a poster created by the Surfrider Foundation of Australia). 
130
 See Young, above n 45, 8 (reproducing the ‘Tribal Law of Surfing’ plaque). 
131
 See Surfers Code of Ethics, above n 44. 
132
 See Jury, above n 47, 116. 
133
 See Bill of Rights, above n 57. 
134
 See Part V. 
135
 See, for example, Robert D Cooter, ‘Decentralised Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural 
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant’ (1996) 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
1643, 1684-85; Ellickson, above n 27, 169 (providing examples such as norms of racial intolerance). 
136
 See Rose, above n 12. 
137
 See ibid. 
138
 Ibid 723-30. 
139
 Ibid. 
 678   DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 9 NO 2 
 
erty’ than the unorganised general public, because a customary public comes closer 
to the management capacities of a government.’140   
 
Surfing may fit within this picture.  Surfers are such a large group it seems unlikely 
that they would manage a resource any better than the general public.  Nevertheless, 
surfers have shown themselves capable of generating their own customs regarding 
the management of their common resource.  These customs are complex and subtle 
and would be extraordinarily difficult to implement through a formal governmental 
body.  While under the management of these customs, the waves could be consid-
ered an inherently public property. 
 
Interestingly, the surfers’ commons shares an important feature with the other 
examples of inherently public property provided by Rose such as public paths and 
waterways.  In these commons, overuse does not have the long-term adverse conse-
quences that it can cause in other contexts.  Thus, while over-fishing today can 
destroy future seasons, a failure to observe the drop-in rule today will not ruin 
tomorrow’s waves.  Similarly, overcrowding and uncooperative behaviour on a 
waterway is unlikely to prevent the waterway from being used as a thoroughfare 
tomorrow.  This lowers the stakes involved in competition for the resource.  For 
example, individuals don’t have to worry about this being the last chance for them 
to use the resource before they fall victim to others’ defection.  Perhaps this is an 
essential feature of inherently public property. 
 
Unfortunately, it is premature to declare a ‘comedy of the commons.’  In a true 
comedy of the commons there is an additional factor: greater use is actually a posi-
tive good.141  Surfing is not like this.  Even though congestion does not deplete the 
resource, surfers do not actually want more congestion.  Thus, the cooperative 
norms of surfing are not the end of the story.  Surfing norms also include the unco-
operative norms of localism and their attendant violence.   Nevertheless, I think it 
makes sense to laud the success of cooperative surf norms before discussing local-
ism.  Although it will be seen that localism is a significant problem, I believe that 
dramatic stories about localism could distract from the fact that cooperative surf 
norms are an enormous success.142  Essentially, I don’t want the reader to fall victim 
to availability bias and only remember crazy stories about the violent ‘Bay Boys’ of 
Palos Verdes.143  The reader should also remember that millions of people surf 
regularly around the world and violent conflict among these surfers remains rare. 
 
                                                        
140
 Ibid 743. 
141
 See ibid 767-68 (noting that increased participation can enhance the value of many social and com-
mercial activities). 
142
 Justice Greg James makes the same point.  See Surf Forum 1, above n 43, 233 (commentary by 
Justice Greg James) (arguing that press coverage of surfing violence, like recent sensationalist press 
coverage of home invasions, could make such incidents seem more frequent than they really are and lead 
to unnecessary regulation). 
143
 Basically, availability bias is our tendency to believe that dramatic and memorable events are more 
common than they really are.  For a good discussion of availability bias, see Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman, ‘Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability’ (1973) 5 Cognitive Psy-
chology 207-302.   For crazy stories about the Bay Boys see Part VI(C). 
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V LOCALISM NORMS (PREVENTING A TRAGEDY OF THE 
COMMONS?) 
 
Many surfers who’ve spent years of their lives learning the curves and 
moods of a powerful and alluring surf spot feel a sense of ownership that 
makes land-based property rights seem feeble in comparison.144   
 
The cooperative norms of surfing are not the end of the story.  A visiting surfer 
arriving at a new break will want to know the intensity of the ‘localism’ at the 
break.145  Localism can range from norms conferring some higher status on locals to 
norms that enforce extra-legal proprietary claims.  At their most extreme, localism 
norms are enforced through violence. 
 
Status has little role in the cooperative norms of surfing.  Although beginners are 
obliged to surf at mellow breaks146 and longboarders must not abuse their advan-
tages147, the norms of surfing usually apply equally to all surfers.  For example, the 
drop-in rule gives priority to the surfer on the inside even if that surfer is a beginner 
and the surfer on the outside is a former world champion.148  Localism injects status 
into the mix.   
 
Essentially, localism is a diverse and variable set of norms conferring higher status 
and priority on a group of ‘local’ surfers.  A surfer gains the status of being a ‘local’ 
through surfing a break regularly.149  Thus, a ‘local’ need not actually live near the 
break.  However, a local does need to surf the break frequently enough that the 
other regular surfers recognise him or her as a regular.  Localism relies on the 
‘locals’ being able to distinguish locals from outsiders.  Thus, it is possible for a 
surfer to claim priority as a local over someone who actually lives much closer to 
the break.150  The most important requirement to attain local status is to have a long 
history surfing at the break.  Establishing this history is often referred to as ‘paying 
dues’.151 
 
The norms of localism are not as fixed as the basic cooperative norms of surfing.  
The most important differences are in the level of deference expected from visitors 
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and the level of hostility demonstrated toward visitors.   Localism can be considered 
mild, moderate or heavy depending on these differences.152 
 
Milder forms of localism involve nothing more than an expectation that locals 
should receive a measure of additional deference.  Surfing at a mildly localised 
break may involve no more than taking extra care not to drop in on locals and 
competing less aggressively for the best set waves.  This mild form of localism 
serves as an extra layer of norms that is added to the cooperative norms of surfing. 
In contrast, surfing at a heavily localised break can mean risking serious assault.  
Consider the following description of the atmosphere at Lunada Bay in Los Ange-
les:  
 
Notoriously localised by a crew that all know each other.  Keep a low pro-
file, walk softly and carry a big stick.  Park your car blocks away, or have 
someone stay with the car.  If it’s not too crowded there is the remote pos-
sibility that you’ll catch a couple of waves, and not be verbally or physi-
cally assaulted!153 
 
In contrast to milder forms of localism, heavy localism displaces the cooperative 
norms of surfing as it aims for the outright exclusion on non-locals.  The locals 
themselves may distribute waves according to ordinary surfing norms; they just 
refuse to apply the norms to outsiders. 
 
Although I have divided localism into three categories, it is important note that 
these groupings are very flexible.  It will be seen that the severity of localism varies 
along many dimensions.  These include the level of deference expected from visi-
tors, whether visitors encounter verbal abuse, whether locals tolerate disfavoured 
groups such as wave-ski riders and the frequency of violence and property damage.  
Nevertheless, the variation among these factors can be considered together as de-
termining an overall level of hostility encountered by outsiders. 
 
It is also worth noting that the local ‘vibe’ can change rapidly even at a single 
break.  For example, a break may have an easygoing ambience for the first hours 
after dawn and then become very competitive a few hours later.154  A surfer who 
has already paid his ‘dues’ with the early morning locals can arrive at 8am and 
encounter hostility from a different crowd of regulars.155 
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A Mild localism 
As noted above, this form of localism is mostly compatible with the healthy norms 
of surfing.  Essentially, ‘mild localism’ means showing extra deference to local 
surfers.  This deference is shown through taking extra caution not to drop in on a 
local and through observing a few extra norms. 
  
The norms (for visitors) of mild localism include:  
 1)  Don’t arrive in a large group156 
 2) Ease into the lineup (don’t compete aggressively too early)157 
 3) Let locals surf most of the best set waves158 
4) Take extra caution to avoid violating any ordinary surf norms (i.e. 
don’t get in a local’s way!) 
 
Together, these concrete norms can implement the abstract norm of ‘respect the 
locals’. Observing these norms demonstrates deference to the locals and helps 
mitigate the effects of crowding for the locals. 
 
Surf journalist DC Green describes arriving with a group of five at a localised break 
where four surfers were already surfing: ‘One guy strolled over from a van, leaned 
in and muttered, ‘Look I’m not a local.  But you guys better not all paddle out at 
once.’  [My companion] already knew this unwritten crowd control law, but he 
thanked the guy all the same.’159  This norm against travelling in large groups seems 
mainly directed at minimising the impact of crowding on locals.  If localism is 
understood as being, at least in part, a reaction to overcrowding, then we might 
postulate that more crowding will lead to more severe localism.160  Thus, if visitors 
wish to minimise the severity of the localism they experience then they should take 
care to minimise the extent to which they are seen as a cause of crowding.  Surfline 
recommends the following rule of thumb: ‘if there’s [sic] a few guys out: avoid 
increasing the numbers in the water by more than 25%.’161 
 
The next three norms serve the dual purpose of minimising the impact of crowding 
and conferring higher status on locals.  Overall, these norms allow locals to set the 
tone (or, as surfers say, the ‘vibe’) of the surf session.  Surfline advises visitors to 
‘take a back seat and let the local surfers dictate the pace of your surf, until they’re 
confident enough of your intentions to give you a couple of set waves.’162   
 
Notice that this implies that the locals can control the distribution of the set waves.  
At heavily localised breaks this control may be enforced through outright threats 
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and violence.  Violence is not necessary, however.  At breaks with milder forms of 
localism the locals may be able to control the distribution of waves simply through 
their knowledge of the break.  If visitor competes too aggressively, ‘a local (or more 
than one) will almost certainly use his or her superior knowledge of the spot to 
confuse and frustrate you.’163   
 
Locals can ‘frustrate’ visitors by assertively using their experience and familiarity 
with the break to exploit a feature of the drop-in rule.  Recall that the drop-in rule 
gives priority to the surfer who is closest to the peak.  Successfully catching a wave 
very close to the peak can be very challenging because that is where the wave is at 
its steepest.  Thus, the drop-in rule ‘under competitive conditions can lead to a cycle 
in which surfers may attempt to take-off in ever more ‘tight’ situations.’164  This 
means that it will require considerable skill to get priority.165  In this situation a 
group of experienced locals can use their familiarity with the wave to dominate the 
break.166  Thus, visitors may have to effectively wait for ‘permission’ to get a prized 
set wave.  Sometimes this permission will take the form of an explicit invitation to 
catch a wave.167  Other times visitors will simply wait for locals to relax and com-
pete less aggressively before they will attempt to catch a prize wave.  
 
B Moderate localism 
Violence among surfers is a problem which has existed for many years.  
Typically, this involves ‘localism,’ in which persons who frequent a cer-
tain area will attempt to discourage others from using the area by means of 
escalating intimidation techniques.  Most often, this is manifested by 
threats at varying levels or attempts to cut off the non-local surfer attempt-
ing to surf.  When these are ineffective, the problem occasionally rises to 
physical violence.168 
  
There is a fundamental difference between mild localism and what I am calling 
moderate and heavy localism.  The latter forms of localism involve active efforts to 
discourage visitors from surfing a break while mild localism merely seeks deference 
and especially good behaviour from visitors.  Thus, at moderately and heavily 
localised breaks the local surfers claim quasi-proprietary rights over the surf break.  
These rights are enforced through informal and often illegal tactics.  The intensity 
of the tactics employed determines how ‘localised’ the break is. 
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Moderate localism will tolerate some outsiders while heavy localism aims for the 
outright exclusion of visiting surfers.  The tools of these forms of localism include 
‘stink-eye’, explicit demands to leave, deliberately getting in the way of visiting 
surfers, marking territory through graffiti, property damage and physical violence.  
Although moderate localism can use all of these tools, physical violence and prop-
erty damage will be rare and may be limited to certain out-groups such as body-
boarders or wave-ski riders.   
 
The mildest form of intimidation or discouragement encountered by visiting surfers 
is the dirty look, or, as surfers call it, ‘stink-eye’.169  Stink-eye is probably the 
easiest way to make visitors feel unwelcome without breaking the law or risking a 
violent response from a visitor.  Of course, the downside to such a mild form of 
intimidation is that many visitors will simply ignore it.  Thus, stink-eye alone is 
unlikely to succeed in keeping away crowds and locals may have to increase their 
intimidation. 
 
‘The most common tactics, and the most difficult to police, are threats and 
taunts.’170  Threats and insults are the next level of intimidation after stink-eye.  A 
typical verbal act of localism would involve a local surfer telling a visitor that the 
break is for ‘locals only’.171  Along with verbal threats, surfers may also return to 
their cars to find a note under the windscreen wiper discouraging them from coming 
back.172   
 
Verbal intimidation can vary from a simple insult (such as calling a visiting surfer a 
‘kook’) to an illegal threat.  For example, a Brazilian surfer visiting Palos Verdes in 
Los Angeles reported being surrounded by 15 locals who told him that they would 
‘break my face’ if he surfed there.173  Verbal intimidation, even when illegal, has 
the advantage of being almost impossible to prosecute.174  Moreover, this form of 
intimidation is almost never reported to authorities even when it is routine.175 
 
Locals also use physical markers or signs to intimidate visitors.  While the waves 
themselves cannot be marked, nearby buildings and parking lots are often explicitly 
marked by graffiti telling visitors to leave.  Anti-visitor graffiti can sometimes be 
directed at a specific group of outsiders.  For example, graffiti saying ‘‘LA go 
home’ . . . used to be painted onto the flyover near Rincon Point beach, south of 
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Santa Barbara, one of the best surf sites on the California coast.’176  More com-
monly, visitors will encounter graffiti with the basic message of localism: ‘Locals 
only’.177  At a break I often visit (but never surf) in Rhode Island ‘locals only’ was, 
until recently, painted in large red letters in the middle of the parking lot.  
 
Locals also make things unpleasant for visitors by deliberately dropping in on them.  
Deliberately dropping in on a surfer is known as ‘fading’.178  If the locals regularly 
fade a visitor then they can effectively ruin all of his or her waves.  Usually, a 
victim of fading would have authority to sanction the person who has violated the 
drop-in rule.  At a localised break, however, the locals may react very negatively to 
being sanctioned by outsiders.  Surf journalist Derek Rielly claims that he has ‘seen 
a Burleigh local drop in on a visiting surfer, veer threateningly toward him, collide, 
then surface throwing punches at the stunned bloke.’179  Visitors will often quietly 
accept a fade because of fear of such behaviour.  Thus, localism can fundamentally 
alter the most important cooperative norm of surfing. 
 
Fading serves the dual purpose of mitigating the effects of crowding and demon-
strating the superior status of locals.  Fading allows locals to take more waves, 
particularly when they are otherwise struggling to compete.  ‘If a local gets frus-
trated, the next wave is his, whether he is on the inside or not. . . . [t]his is one of the 
variations on the drop-in rule, and one that is understood by all surfers.’180  Fading 
can also reduce crowding by discouraging visitors from returning. 
 
When visitors accept fading they acknowledge the superior status of locals.  As one 
local explained:  
 
Locals don’t fade each other.  But if that fella’s [a visitor’s] ability is good 
enough and he deals with it [being faded] without reacting verbally or 
physically, we’ll stop doing it.  If he deals with it, he gets respect quicker 
than a loudmouth who’s got a good surfing ability.181   
 
Thus, quietly accepting fading is a form of ‘paying dues’ that might allow a visitor 
to gain ‘respect’ from the locals. 
 
Moderate localism can also involve attempts to completely exclude less favoured 
surfing groups such as bodyboarders and wave-ski riders.  Bodyboarders (who are 
sometimes derisively called ‘spongers’ by other surfers) have an advantage over 
other surfers because they do not need to stand up when they catch a wave.  This 
means that bodyboarders can catch steep waves close to the peak more easily than 
surfers with a similar level of experience.  This gives bodyboarders an advantage 
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under the drop-in rule and can breed resentment, especially in crowded conditions.  
Wave-ski riders also have an advantage over other surfers because of their much 
greater paddle speed.  Thus, it is unsurprising that bodyboarders and wave-ski riders 
encounter the most hostility at localised breaks.  When Stephen Kuhn asked surfers 
in eastern Australia to name rules of the surf, some responded that the rules of the 
surf simply did not apply to bodyboarders.182 
 
Adam Koleits is a former semi-professional surfer and a local at Trigg Point in 
Perth, Australia.  In an interview, Koleits described the Trigg locals’ attempts to rid 
their break of bodyboarders and wave-ski riders.183  He claimed that ‘[t]he Point is 
out of control still, but if we let those goat-boats [wave-skis] come through, plus the 
esky lids [bodyboarders], it would be twice as packed with not one bit of respect.’184  
Strategies for removing wave-skiers included stealing paddles and turning skis 
upside down to force the rider to eject from his safety belt.185  
 
Koleits claims that ordinary surfers are not met with the same level of hostility.  He 
says that he accepts ordinary surfers because ‘we’ve all got to surf. .  . . [b]ut the 
other types of craft at crowded spots, they’re pushing their luck.’186  Highly compe-
tent surfers in particular will be accepted.  Koleits claimed that ‘[t]he locals are 
friendly to anyone who can pull a bottom turn and do a belt.’187 
 
Finally, if a visitor makes the mistake of dropping in on a local he or she may be a 
victim of a ‘spearing’.  A spearing occurs when a surfer deliberately shoots his or 
her board at another surfer.188  A surfer is particularly vulnerable to this form of 
assault after dropping in.  This is because the surfer will be directly in front of an 
annoyed surfer who is already riding the wave and thus has momentum to shoot out 
his or her board.189 
C Heavy localism 
Heavy localism aims at the outright exclusion of non-locals.  Heavy localism in-
cludes all of the intimidation tools of moderate localism but applies these tools with 
greater frequency and severity.  Heavy localism often includes physical violence 
and property damage.  Visitors to heavily localised breaks will often be immedi-
ately confronted with intimidation.  If visitors are not deterred by this intimidation 
they risk assault.  
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The locals at Lunada Bay in the Palos Verdes Estates neighbourhood of Los Ange-
les provide one of the most infamous examples of localism.190  The Lunada Bay 
locals are known as the ‘Bay Boys’.  In this subpart, I will focus on the Bay Boys as 
a discussion of their localism will cover all of the tactics of heavy localism.     
 
The first thing to note is that the Bay Boys are very close-knit.  ‘The Bay Boys 
proudly describe themselves as a brotherhood - an endless fraternity from father to 
son - so close, so loyal that it dictates their social life and business dealings.’191  
Their home, Palos Verdes, is one of the most exclusive areas of Los Angeles.192  
Despite the price of the real estate, the Lunada Bay surf break is below a public 
park and is supposed to be open to the public.193 
 
The break at Lunada Bay is at the bottom of a very steep hill that is almost a cliff.  
Surfers need to park their cars at the top of this hill, as there is no road down.  In 
fact, there is no maintained footpath down the hill so the descent is challenging for 
those who are unfamiliar with the landscape.194  The locals prefer this situation as it 
‘keeps the traffic down.’195  This geography also makes the break easier for the 
locals to defend through intimidation.  Visitors must arrive and park at the top of 
the hill and then descend on a particular path.  Thus, a handful of locals can keep a 
vigil at the top of the cliff and confront any visitor.196 
 
A small set of Bay Boys sometimes will keep a vigil at the top of the cliff while 
others surf.  These locals will warn visiting non-surfers about the dangerous descent 
to the beach.197  They will also warn visiting surfers of the dangers of descending 
the cliffs.  Of course, they make it clear to the surfers they will provide most of this 
danger themselves.  As one Bay Boy put it, ‘[w]e promise [any visiting surfer] a 
very humiliating experience. . . . [w]e tell him 20 grown men will be in his face.’198  
Sadly, the visitor is well advised to follow this advice to leave as the Bay Boys’ 
tactics will quickly escalate if he or she actually tries to surf there. 
 
If he or she manages to pass any Bay Boys at the top of the cliff, the visitor then has 
to descend.  This leaves the visitor vulnerable to rocks thrown from above.199  An 
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alternative option would be to arrive by boat.  Unfortunately, as Randy Meistrel 
found out, boaters still have to deal with the Bay Boys who are already in the water: 
 
Randy Meistrel tried to avoid cliff fights and slashed tires by anchoring . . . 
outside Lunada Bay, then paddling in to surf.  Bay Boys swarmed him. 
‘Somebody grabbed me.  I took a swing.  Four guys were holding me un-
der and punching me.’  He says he broke free and paddled back to his 
boat.200 
 
Unsurprisingly, this violent attack was successful in deterring future boating at-
tempts from Meistrel.201 
 
Surfers who arrive by car risk vandalism to their vehicle.  It is very hard to monitor 
one’s vehicle while in the water surfing.  Thus, damaging cars is a common intimi-
dation tactic at heavily localised breaks.202  At a heavily localised break in South 
Australia visitors have had windscreens smashed and have even had cars pushed off 
cliffs.203  At Lunada Bay, vandalism is so common that visiting surfers have been 
advised to bring somebody to watch their car.204   
 
The Bay Boys have been quite creative with their violence and do not limit them-
selves to throwing stones and punches.  Some visitors report receiving cuts on their 
feet after Bay Boys left glass on the path while they were surfing.205  Another non-
local, after bravely persisting with surfing at Lunada Bay finally ‘saw the light’ 
after some Bay Boys shot at him with a pellet gun.206  Obviously, violent tactics like 
these could place the Bay Boys at risk of arrest.  I shall discuss why the Bay Boys 
have largely been able to avoid police attention in Part VI(B) below. 
 
The severe tactics of heavy localism, such as those practiced by the Bay Boys, can 
attract publicity.207  For example, Tracks magazine recently published a list of the 
worst breaks in Australia for an outsider to visit.208  Generally, locals try to discour-
age publicity for their break.209  If the publicity is sufficiently negative, however, it 
can help to discourage visitors.  One Bay Boy greeted a visiting journalist by telling 
him to ‘keep writing that this is a war zone ... scare ’em away. . . . [w]e don’t like 
riffraff comin’ up here showing their fat butts in front of these million-dollar 
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homes.’210  Thus, as long as the break is infamous as well as famous, publicity may 
deter visitors from showing up at all. 
 
The goals and techniques of localism, unsurprisingly, will often take on a local 
flavour.  In Hawaii, the intimidation tactics of localism are usually directed most 
strongly at non-local surfers who are not native Hawaiians.211  In Puerto Escondido, 
Mexico, where the local surfers are usually much poorer than the visitors, some 
locals have demanded that visitors give them surfing equipment (even boards) to 
avoid local hassles.212   Nevertheless, the intimidation tactics of heavy localism are 
similar wherever it is practiced.  The variation among localism is mostly in the 
frequency and severity with which the intimidation tactics are applied.  The Bay 
Boys of Palos Verdes represent the extreme end of the localism continuum. 
 
D Localism tied to land-based property rights 
As noted above, it is usually possible to become a ‘local’ at a break without owning 
property nearby.  Even the Bay Boys include a few non-residents of Palos Verdes in 
their ranks.213  A very different form of localism has arisen at a small number of 
surf breaks, however.  At these breaks, the localism is explicitly tied to ownership 
of nearby property.  Normally, a surfer can seek acceptance by the locals through 
showing deference to them and surfing frequently enough to be seen as a regular.  
Surfers call this process ‘paying dues’.  In contrast, at a small number of breaks a 
surfer can ‘pay dues’ by actually paying dues.  This might involve buying property 
or simply paying to stay at a surf resort.  I will refer to this form of localism as 
‘cash localism’. 
 
The most famous location of cash localism is the Hollister Ranch near Santa Bar-
bara, known to surfers simply as The Ranch.  The Ranch has something of a 
‘mythic history’ for Californian surfers.214  The Hollister Ranch was subdivided in 
the early 1970s.215  The new property owners put the surfing community on notice 
that access to the surf breaks was to be limited to property owners.  In July 1972, 
the manager of the Hollister Ranch, Dick Larue, announced to Surfer magazine that 
‘The Ranch is closed.’216  He said ‘I know this article is going to come out in a 
magazine that’s read by all the surfers in the world . . . and I just have to tell the 
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kids - the only way they can use The Ranch is to buy a parcel.’217  Today, a surfer 
can gain recreation rights to The Ranch by purchasing a twelfth-interest in a parcel 
(costing approximately $125,000).218 
 
The property owners of The Ranch only control the land-based access to the surf 
breaks.  Thus, it is possible for surfers to travel to The Ranch’s famous surf via 
boat.  The result has been ‘a venomous owner-versus-boater feud.’219  The owners 
use the tactics of heavy localism to discourage boaters.220  In one famous incident, 
‘Angie Reno, one of surfing’s great talents . . . had to fend off a machete attack.’221  
Even invited guests of owners can encounter hostility.  Glen Hening reports that 
while at The Ranch with two friends, both of whom were ‘parcel owners who have 
surfed The Ranch for decades, we couldn’t surf Rights and Lefts. . . . seems that 
given who was out at R&Ls that day, showing up with even one guest was verbo-
ten.’222 
 
The difference between cash localism and ordinary surf localism can lead to distinct 
tensions.  In the words of a regular boater: 
 
That whole scene bugs me.  I’ve spent a lot of time along that stretch of 
coast since my first trip in 1973.   I’ve travelled in by car and by boat.  Just 
because some punk comes up with the scratch for a twelfth-interest in a 
piece of dirt eight miles from the beach hardly gives him the right to tell 
me how I should pursue my boating interests.223 
 
This boater resents being prevented from becoming accepted at The Ranch.  Under 
the norms of traditional localism, a boater might be able to ‘pay dues’ at The Ranch 
and become accepted as a local (or at least tolerated by the locals).  Under The 
Ranch’s cash localism, however, someone with around $125,000 can jump the 
queue and become an ‘instant local’.  It is not surprising that this annoys the boat-
ers, some of whom have been surfing The Ranch for decades.  
 
Another form of cash localism involves surf tourism.  Land-based developers have 
claimed exclusive surfing rights at nearby breaks.  For example, at Tuvarua in Fiji: 
 
A group of Americans built a resort then claimed exclusive surfing rights 
to a reef just off the island and another a fifteen minute boat ride away.  
Money was paid to local tribes to enforce this self-created law and surfers 
                                                        
217
  Ibid. 
218
  Anthony Kronman, Personal communication February 2004. 
219
  Kew, above n 169, 118. 
220
 Dean Kronman has once surfed at The Ranch as a guest of an owner.  He told me that his host 
claimed that boaters were only likely to encounter hostility if they arrived in large groups.  Anthony 
Kronman, Personal communication February 2004. 
221
 See Hening, above n 169, 140. 
222
 Ibid.  One of Glen’s hosts said, ‘I don’t want my tires flattened again.’  Ibid. 
223
 Kew, above n 169, 121. 
 690   DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 9 NO 2 
 
from resorts on other islands daring to ride the reefs were told to leave or, 
worse, became victims of violence.224 
 
The owner of a resort in the Maldives also claims exclusive rights to a surf break.225   
The cash localism of Tuvarua is very different from traditional localism.  First, like 
at The Ranch, a surfer can become a ‘local’ by paying money.  In Tuvarua surfers 
become ‘temporary locals’ by paying to stay at the correct resort.  Tuvarua is differ-
ent from The Ranch, however.  At The Ranch it is the locals themselves that must 
defend ‘their’ turf from the boaters.  In Tuvarua the task of intimidation has been 
subcontracted to paid enforcers.  Thus, in Tuvarua we have something that, even 
though it is not sanctioned by the state, looks a lot like fee simple. 
 
E Other norms among locals 
In this subpart, I shall complete my description of localism by reviewing some of 
the norms that govern the behaviour of locals.  Norms govern the process of becom-
ing a local and also govern the responsibilities of locals to each other.  For example, 
locals may have a duty to prevent publicity of their break.  Also, locals often have 
strong internal hierarchies that influence the obligations of individual members. 
 
I have already partly discussed some of the norms governing the process of becom-
ing a local.  Essentially, the process involves slowly gaining acceptance by regu-
larly surfing a break while showing deference to the established locals.226  A new 
arrival can try to gain acceptance and establish familiarity by starting out at less 
desirable nearby breaks.  Oscar Liivak told me about his experience establishing 
himself at Santa Cruz’s famous Steamer Lane.227  After moving to the area, Oscar 
began surfing regularly at the least desirable of Steamer Lane’s three peaks.  After 
Oscar had spent 5 months surfing almost every day at this spot, an established local 
paddled up to Oscar and told him he could move up to the most desirable peak.  The 
duration of a dues-paying process like this can vary widely.  At many breaks it can 
take years to become accepted as a local.228 
 
As might be expected, the heavier the localism the harder it is to be accepted.  Once 
again, the Bay Boys provide an extreme case.  Consider the experience of Tracy 
Ely.  Mr. Ely has surfed in Palos Verdes for decades.229  Moreover, his wife went to 
high school with many of the Bay Boys and he has often socialised with them.  He 
has ‘surfed with them at other breaks, just not Lunada.’230  Despite being familiar to 
the Bay Boys both socially and as a surfer, Ely has never been ‘invited’ to surf with 
them at Lunada and he knows that he’s not ‘welcome’ to surf there.231  Ely says that 
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‘[i]t’s a generational thing up there now: you’ve got guys surfing out there who are 
40, and now their kids are surfing out there.’232  Thus, at Lunada Bay it seems that 
the only way to become a local is to be the child of a Bay Boy. 
 
After being accepted by the locals, a surfer will usually start at the bottom of a 
hierarchy.  Young surfers (often known as ‘grommets’) are expected to show defer-
ence to older locals.  Trigg local Adam Koleits says that ‘[w]hen I was young you 
had to earn your respect. . . . [w]e did cheeky things but we didn’t push it.’233  If the 
young surfers ‘stepped out of line in those days you expected to get a bit of pay-
back.’234  Koleits claims after he dropped in on an older surfer ‘the guy got me and 
threw me head-first into a glass recycling bin.’235  Koleits claims that the older 
surfers deserve a greater share of the waves because they ‘have waited in line for a 
long time.’236   
 
In Lunada Bay the older surfers get to delegate the task of intimidating outsiders to 
the younger surfers.  Journalist Michael Goodman interviewed ‘[a] Bay Boy with 
28 years [sic] seniority - who agreed to talk only if granted anonymity.’237  This Bay 
Boy told Goodman that while ‘constant vigilance against outsiders ‘is up to all of 
us,’ . . . the actual ‘hassling’ of intruders most often falls to the young.’238  A 
surfer’s ability will also influence his place in the hierarchy.  The way to be ‘so-
cially upwardly mobile’ at a surf break is to improve your surfing.239  Surfers gen-
erally find that ‘the better you surfed, the higher you sat in the chain of authority 
and status.’240  Dominant surfers can enjoy considerable privileges.  For example, a 
‘local hero’ can have ‘priority just by paddling for a wave.’241  Consider the follow-
ing story: 
 
I remember a time when a Brazilian guy . . . took off behind Gerry Lopez 
at Pipeline.  I though it was so rude of him - after all, Gerry is a household 
name in the Islands and the King of Pipe.  Who would ever think of has-
sling him for waves?  Suffice to say [the Brazilian] didn’t last long at Pipe 
- or even catch any more waves that day.242 
 
What is remarkable about this tale is that the author believes that it is rude to take 
off behind Gerry Lopez.  Under the drop-in rule, the surfer behind Lopez would 
have priority.  Nevertheless, Lopez’s status is such that surfers violate a local norm 
simply by competing with him for waves at Pipeline. 
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Another important norm of localism requires locals to minimise or prevent publicity 
of their break.  Before the break became well known, locals at a break near Santa 
Cruz parked their cars well away from the surf so as not to draw attention to their 
spot.243  The locals ‘used to park a mile up the highway . . . and walk down . . . just 
to throw off the Valleys [non-local surfers].’244  Failure to observe this practice was 
punished.  A local explained that ‘[w]henever some geek parked too close . . . we’d 
smash their headlights and leave a note on the windshield telling them where to 
park and how to walk down here.’245   
 
At heavily localised breaks even locals can be sanctioned for failing to prevent 
publicity for a break.  Surf journalist DC Green suffered a harrowing ordeal at the 
hands of the locals at a break he deliberately misnames ‘Saltbush’.246  A local told 
them to leave the area after Green’s photographer set up his camera.  The local 
explained that if the other locals saw that he had let them take photos then the other 
locals would throw rocks at him as well.247 
 
The norm discouraging publicity can make the work of surf journalists quite diffi-
cult as they often encounter hostility from locals.248  A surf photographer at Lunada 
Bay ‘reports that after he was threatened, he resorted to shooting from a station 
wagon with one-way windows.’249  In response to this kind of pressure, surf jour-
nalists often deliberately misname the breaks they cover and many (if not most) of 
the photograph captions in surf magazines do not name the relevant break.250 
 
F The surf gangs of California? 
There is a striking parallel between surfer localism and the behaviour revealed in 
Acheson’s famous studies of lobster fisherman.  James M. Acheson has spent many 
years studying the behaviour of groups he has named the ‘lobster gangs’ of 
Maine.251  These lobster gangs apply their own set of extra-legal localism norms to 
regulate the Maine lobster industry. 
 
Acheson discovered that, in order to fish for lobster in Maine, one had to be a 
member of a ‘harbour gang.’252  Each harbour gang has its own fishing territory.253  
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The harbour gangs are unofficial organisations and their territories are not recog-
nised by the state.  Thus, the harbour gangs themselves have to defend their fishing 
range.  ‘[L]ocal norms regarding both entry into harbour gangs and the maintenance 
of boundaries are enforceable by the use of violence which is sanctioned locally.’254 
 
Aspiring lobster fishermen have to ‘pay dues’ in a similar manner to surfers wishing 
to gain acceptance at a localised break.  In both cases, the aspirant should gradually 
ease his or her way into the community while scrupulously obeying the local norms.  
Acheson claims that ‘[t]he most important single factor influencing entry into a 
harbour gang is willingness to abide by the local norms regarding lobstering.’255  
Gradual entry is also important: 
 
Anyone seeking to go lobstering will experience some degree of hostility 
from those already established in the business.  Some men never are ac-
cepted.  A local boy will have relatively little trouble if he is a long-time 
resident of the community, if his father’s family is established in lobstering 
. . . .  His chances of success are greatly enhanced if he begins fishing from 
a skiff with a few traps while still in high school and then slowly expands 
to become a full-time lobsterman.256 
 
This account could easily be adapted to describe surfer localism. 
 
Like surfers, lobstermen defend their territory through escalating sanctions.  Locals 
will usually provide a warning in response to the first intrusion.  A warning can be 
provided by slightly molesting traps or by using an established signal (such as tying 
certain kinds of knots in the ropes attached to a trap).257  Similarly, surfers usually 
begin by warning intruders verbally, through graffiti or through notes placed under 
windshield wipers.  The next step for lobstermen is deliberately leaving the visitor’s 
traps open.258  This takes away the visitor’s benefit and is similar to the ‘fading’ 
behaviour of surfers.  If an intruding fisherman remains undeterred then his traps 
will be destroyed.259  This is similar to the vehicle damage perpetrated by surfers.  
Unlike in surfing, physical violence is not common among the lobster gangs.  This 
is probably because lobstermen will rarely encounter each other while fishing.  
Nevertheless, lobstermen can apply very serious extra-legal sanctions.  In rare 
cases, boats and wharfs have been destroyed during territorial disputes.260  
 
There is variation among harbour gangs in terms of how vigorously they defend 
their territory.261  Some fishing areas are subject to ‘mixed fishing’ where more than 
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one harbour gang is allowed to fish.262  In contrast, other harbour gangs, especially 
those from island communities, claim exclusive fishing rights to all of ‘their’ terri-
tory and defend these rights doggedly.263  The islanders’ reputation for violence is 
‘known the length of the coast.’264  This reputation deters intruders and is reminis-
cent of the reputation of the Bay Boys in California.  Like the Bay Boys, the island-
based harbour gangs have created ‘little fiefs carved out of the public domain.’265   
 
Some lobstermen claim that the ‘differential propensity to violence’ among differ-
ent gangs is linked to a lack of education and exposure to the outside world among 
the more violent gangs.266  Acheson found that the empirical evidence did not 
support this claim as many islanders were well travelled and educated.267  Acheson 
argues that the most important factor influencing territoriality is the ability of the 
locals to organise.268  Many island harbour gangs are based on close kinship ties and 
thus are able to easily coordinate defence of their territory.269  The island harbour 
gangs also benefit from geography as it is more expensive for intruders to travel to 
the islands to fish.270  This raises the costs of intruders before they even encounter 
the islanders’ resistance. 
 
Surfers have also speculated that the severity of surfer localism is linked to the 
socio-economic status of the perpetrators.  For example, Fred Pawle claims that 
‘conversations with old and new locals around the country found that localism 
peaks when the popularity of a break coincides with its surrounding suburb being at 
the lower end of the socioeconomic ladder.’271  I suggest that this claim is mistaken.  
Of the five worst breaks in Australia, only Maroubra fits this pattern.272  In fact, the 
most heavily localised break in Australia, North Narrabeen, is in Sydney’s wealthy 
northern beaches region.273  Similarly, the United States’ most infamous break, 
Lunada Bay, is in a spectacularly wealthy location. 
 
Acheson’s study of lobsterman suggests a better hypothesis for explaining the 
varying severity of surfer localism.  Locals are best able to defend their turf when 
they are sufficiently close-knit to organise a coordinated resistance.  The close-knit 
Bay Boys provide an excellent example of this.  The Bay Boys are so organised that 
they even delegate intimidation responsibilities within the gang.274  Coordination 
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may be even more important for surfing localism than for lobstermen because 
physical violence is more likely.  Locals will want to be sure that they will be 
backed up in a fight.  Moreover, visiting surfers will be intimidated by the knowl-
edge that they might meet a coordinated force. 
 
Geography is also relevant to the ability of locals to defend their break.  The cliffs 
of Palos Verdes help the Bay Boys defend their turf.  Similarly, isolation makes a 
break easier to defend.  The long drive to Cactus in South Australia and the boat 
ride to The Ranch both increase the costs for any visitors to these breaks.  Visitors 
will also be unsettled by the knowledge that any violence would occur far from any 
official scrutiny.  A journalist preparing a story about The Ranch discovered this 
when no visiting surfers would give him their names.  One surfer claimed that ‘[i]f 
the Ranch surfers got mad at him . . . there would be no one to protect him should 
they decide to exact revenge at the isolated beaches.’275 
 
The parallel between surfer localism and the lobster gangs is even more striking 
when one considers the different stakes involved.  The lobstermen are defending 
their livelihood.  In contrast, surfing is only a recreational activity.   This suggests 
that the value of the resource is not the only factor determining how fiercely it is 
defended.  Some theorists have suggested that certain lobster territories are better 
demarcated and defended because they have greater value as a resource than other 
lobster territories.276  The empirical evidence does not support this view, how-
ever.277  Moreover, the example of surfer localism provides further reason to doubt 
this hypothesis.  Some gangs of surfers defend their territories as vigorously as the 
lobstermen even though only recreation is at stake.  The degree of close-knittedness 
of lobster and surf gangs appears to be the best predictor of how vigorously they 
defend their territory. 
 
G Evaluating localism 
The evils of localism are obvious.  Violence and intimidation are a part of all but 
the mildest forms of localism.278  It is more difficult to outline the positive aspects 
of localism.  Supporters of localism usually point to two main benefits.  These 
benefits are improved environmental stewardship and improved ‘discipline’ or 
‘respect’ in the lineup.  Of these, the second provides the better justification for 
localism. 
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1 Private property and the environment 
Stronger forms of localism involve a quasi-proprietary claim over the waves.  Thus, 
it makes sense to look to the usual arguments in favour of private property to see if 
these support localism.  Two prominent arguments about the benefits of property 
are sometimes associated with the work of Harold Demsetz. 279  First, ‘property 
provides superior incentives for the development of resources relative to a system in 
which access to resources is open to all.’280  Private property provides an incentive 
for development because it ensures that the owner can capture the fruits of any 
improvements made to the property.  Second, private property helps prevent ‘pre-
mature consumption and wasteful dissipation of resources in competition to secure 
the resource.’281  Private property does this by internalising the costs of overuse or 
premature consumption. 
 
The first argument does not provide much support for localism.  The surfers’ com-
mons is difficult to improve.  Apart from a very small number of artificial reefs, the 
surfers’ commons is completely determined by weather patterns and the shape of 
the coastline.  Thus, localism does not provide an incentive for development of the 
surfers’ commons.  In fact, rather than supporting development, localism can lead to 
dead-weight losses.  Steve Hawk, the editor of Surfer magazine, describes a visit to 
Lunada Bay.282  After bravely283 travelling to the break, Hawk was amazed to find 
the waves completely empty: 
 
‘There was nobody around!’ he recalls. ‘Maybe because the waves looked 
pretty small by their standards, but they were big enough to get me 
stoked.’ And alone Hawk remained that sunny spring Saturday. ‘I couldn't 
believe it! Any other beach would have been crowded.’ For the entire af-
ternoon, he had one of the best surf beaches in California to himself.284 
 
The Bay Boys did not notice Hawk’s presence until he left the water, at which point 
he was confronted.285  This story suggests that the Bay Boy’s monopolisation of 
Lunada Bay has lead to the waste of waves that break there on smaller days.  It 
appears that the Bay Boys, who have grown used to uncontested access to Lunada’s 
powerful waves, are not sufficiently interested in smaller days.  Nevertheless, the 
Bay Boys’ reputation is such that other surfers are afraid to take advantage of these 
uncrowded days. 
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The second argument in favour of private property is more promising for localism.  
This argument notes that open resources are often subject to overuse and depletion.  
Locals themselves sometimes advance similar environmental arguments.  For 
example, Bay Boy Peter McCollum claims that the Bay Boys are ‘protecting this 
place [Lunada Bay] to keep it pristine for future generations.’286  Indeed, Lunada 
Bay can be considered more pristine than many other Southern Californian surf 
breaks.  Nevertheless, the Bay Boys cannot claim responsibility for the pristine state 
of Lunada Bay.  In fact, the Bay Boys once built a concrete cabana for themselves 
at Lunada Bay.287  They were forced to tear it down after the cabana received nega-
tive news coverage.288 
 
The environmental argument in favour of surfer localism is weakened by the un-
usual economics of the surfers’ commons.  The surfers’ commons is not in danger 
of long term depletion like many other common resources.  For example, Lunada 
Bay will continue to provide the same number of quality waves regardless of how 
many surfers try to surf there.  Thus, at least from the surfer’s perspective, the 
localism at Lunada Bay does little to safeguard the resource.  Localism may mini-
mise other externalities of surfing (such as erosion of the path down the cliff) but it 
does not affect the quality of the wave. 
 
The environmental justification for localism also conflicts with the reality of surf-
ers’ environmental activism.  Surfers do have a good record of environmental 
activism.  Surfer organisations arrange regular beach clean-ups and have partici-
pated in environmental impact litigation.  These activities are not usually organised 
by groups of locals such as Bay Boys.  Rather, surfer environmentalism is mostly 
organised by large organisations such as The Surfrider Foundation and the Ground-
swell Society.289 The Surfrider Foundation is an international organisation of surfers 
with over 37,000 members.290 The Surfrider Foundation has organised beach clean-
ing, water quality testing, environmental protests and has established environmental 
education programs and scholarships.291 The foundation has also been the plaintiff 
in some important environmental law cases.292  Moreover, rather than being a 
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product of localism, the Surfrider Foundation has organised activities against surfer 
localism.293 
 
Overall, I believe we should be very sceptical of environmental arguments in favour 
of localism.  The activities of The Surfrider Foundation show that surfers can play a 
positive role in the environment through more formal self organisation.  Exclusion-
ary locals appear to be using the environmental argument as a cover for their ac-
tions.  As Mike Kew wrote in response to the claim that the Bay Boys are protecting 
Lunada Bay for future generations: ‘What future generations?  The Bay Boys’ kids 
but no-one else’s?  A public California beach-cum-private Palos Verdes Estates 
fraternity?’294 
 
2 Localism as sustaining cooperative norms 
Another argument for localism is that it helps ensure that the cooperative norms of 
surfing are obeyed.295  This is a more compelling justification for localism.  Some 
theoretical points about norms help to illustrate this.  While most commentators 
believe that norms are welfare maximising for groups this does not mean that 
individuals maximise their welfare by following norms.  Rather, the fact that norms 
are not individually rational gives norms the power to solve collective action prob-
lems.296  Norms can impose costs on individuals in two ways.  First, following the 
dictates of a norm can be costly (such as when a rancher agrees to pay for the dam-
age done by errant cattle despite the lack of legal liability).  Second, enforcing 
norms can impose costs as sanctioning can lead to retaliation or entrench non-
cooperation.297   
 
This raises the question as to why individuals would enforce norms.  McAdams 
notes that the individual costs of norm enforcement raise a second-order collective 
action problem: ‘[I]f others enforce the norm, the individual can gain the norm’s 
benefits without bearing enforcement costs; if others do not enforce the norm, the 
individual’s solo efforts are wasted.’298  Thus, we may wonder ‘why individuals 
will ever begin to sanction violators or why threats of sanctions are ever credi-
ble.’299   
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This second-order collective action problem is especially pressing for surfers as the 
face-to-face sanctions used by surfers are very costly because they risk provoking a 
violent response.300  Surfer localism may provide a solution to this problem.  Local-
ism (even in its milder forms) may provide locals with an incentive to enforce the 
background norms of surfing.  Consider the following discussion of localism from 
Surfline’s Bill of Rights and Lefts: 
 
The Core Local should at all times understand that other surfers have a 
right to ride at the spot he knows so well, and that his enhanced knowledge 
of the break gives him a responsibility as much as a reward.  His responsi-
bility involves leading the wave-sharing rhythm; keeping an eye on surfers 
who look like they might get into trouble; putting a lid on any bullying of 
kids by older surfers; and providing an example to the grommets and be-
ginners of how to behave in a wide range of surfing circumstances.  Tak-
ing care of these responsibilities will guarantee the reward (uninterrupted 
choice of the best set waves).  Ignoring them and taking the reward any-
way will guarantee ongoing ill-feeling in the lineup.301 
 
This passage suggests that locals earn a reward for policing a break.  This reward 
comes in the form of priority over the best waves.  This may solve the second-order 
collective action problem by ensuring that some surfers at a break have an incentive 
to ensure that the norms of surfing are being followed. 
 
Localism may also help ensure that cooperative norms are followed by increasing 
the value of a good reputation and by reducing transaction costs of communication.  
The ‘dues paying’ requirement of localism encourages surfers to devote time to a 
single break and to build long term reputations.  This gives surfers an incentive to 
show that they are willing to observe the rules of the road like the drop-in rule.  
Also, localism can make norm enforcement easier simply by reducing the number 
of surfers at a break.  A surfer or a group of surfers interested in ‘policing’ a break 
through third-party sanctions will obviously have an easier time policing a smaller 
group. 
 
These justifications for localism are not fully persuasive.  First, many surfers are 
willing to sanction others, even violently, outside of the context of localism.302  
Thus, it is unclear to what extent localism is required for the norms to successfully 
regulate behaviour.  Also, it may be that a surfer will be more likely to observe the 
rules of the road at a crowded break because there are more surfers present who 
may decide to sanction misbehaviour.  Moreover, once it is accepted that locals can 
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get priority over visitors then locals may become tempted to start practicing 
stronger forms of localism and start excluding visitors altogether.  It is unclear 
whether the enforcement benefits of milder forms of localism justify the risk of the 
emergence of stronger forms of localism.  Nevertheless, it is plausible that localism 
helps solve the second-order collective action problem with respect to the enforce-
ment of surfing’s cooperative norms. 
 
3 Localism versus severe overcrowding 
A defender of localism might claim that I dismissed the environmental argument in 
favour of localism too quickly.  The defender will claim that there is a danger of 
permanent degradation of the surfers’ commons.  This degradation comes in the 
form of regular overcrowding so extreme that surfing becomes difficult for every-
body at the break.  The local will claim that intimidation by locals is required to 
keep the crowds at some breaks to a manageable size. 
 
The defender of localism is correct to note that severe crowding can ruin surfing for 
everybody.  Consider the following description of a crowded day at Kirra Point on 
Queensland’s Gold Coast: 
 
[Mark Rabbidge], his wife Pam Burridge, son Michael and mate Peter 
Townend recently surfed Kirra Point on a good day, when the crowd was 
ridiculously thick. . . . ‘Within 20 minutes the four of us were back on the 
beach,’ [Mark] says.  ‘We were all saying you can’t ride it.  There’s too 
much flotsam and jetsam in the way.  And we’re all capable surfers – two 
of us were former world champions. . . . You simply couldn’t ride the 
wave for all the people in the way.’303 
 
Clearly, when world champions cannot even ride the wave, crowding has become 
unmanageable.  A day of extreme crowding is a temporary tragedy of the commons.  
If these crowds return day after day then surfers will be wasting a break.  If localism 
can prevent this then it may be justified as preventing a tragedy of the commons 
after all. 
 
Dwayne Harris, a local from Burleigh Heads (another Gold Coast surf break near 
Kirra Point), claims that Burleigh’s heavy localism helps to control the crowds.  He 
says: 
 
[A] few guys get angry and get into fights, but you need that, you need that 
out there.  After you see a good bit of biffo [fighting] go down, the lineup 
clears itself a bit. . . . It really needs it some days. You need a fight to sort 
it out.304 
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Dwayne contrasts the situation at Burleigh to Kirra, claiming that ‘at Kirra there’s 
[sic] locals but they don’t police it anymore.’305 
 
There are two reasons to believe that localism cannot be justified as a way to pre-
vent extreme overcrowding.  First, it is important to note that localism does not 
seem to be causally linked to this threat.  As noted above, heavy localism appears to 
be most closely linked to the close-knittedness of those that practice it.306  Admit-
tedly, heavy localism is practiced at Narrabeen, Burleigh and Lunada Bay where 
high quality waves and nearby cities ensure that severe overcrowding is a threat.  
Nevertheless, heavy localism is also found at many locations where severe crowd-
ing is highly unlikely.  For example, Oregon and Washington are both known for 
heavy localism.307  Cold water and large distances from major population centres 
mean that the waves in Oregon and Washington will never get nearly as crowded as 
those in Southern California.  Thus, while heavy localism is aimed at discouraging 
other surfers and keeping crowds down, it is not limited to locations where severe 
crowding is a threat.  Second, and more importantly, localism fails right at the point 
where it is needed most.  This is because any overcrowding that is sufficiently 
severe to ruin a break will overwhelm the resources of localism.  Thus, localism 
fails right where it is needed most.   
 
Crowds of new surfers can arrive every day at easily accessed breaks close to large 
population centres.  The locals will have to engage in daily intimidation of hordes 
of new people if they want to keep the crowds down.  The costs of this exercise will 
increase rapidly with larger crowds.  As a result: 
 
[T]he hard-line localism of yesteryear – where a small, close-knit crew of 
regulars uses such intimidation to keep outsiders at bay – is fast becoming 
extinct.  The sheer number of surfers in the water these days makes polic-
ing the line-up a bootless exercise.308 
 
This suggests that surfers should look for other solutions if they wish to prevent 
extreme overcrowding.309 
 
It might be objected that heavy localism has survived at some urban breaks such as 
Lunada Bay.  The Bay Boys do not have to continually intimidate new visitors 
because few visitors dare to surf there.310  This appears to be a result of the reputa-
tion they have built through their extreme tactics.311  Nevertheless, the Bay Boys are 
an unusual case.  Their extreme tactics survive in an environment where the local 
non-surfing community tolerates their behaviour and the police pay them little 
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attention.312  Also, the cliff at Lunada Bay makes the break easier to defend.  Heavy 
localism has not prevented crowding at most urban breaks. 
 
Locals at crowded breaks may still be able to exclude less favoured groups of 
surfers.  Locals at the crowded urban break of Trigg Point in Perth exclude body-
boarders and wave-ski riders.313  Longboarders are excluded at some breaks in the 
Santa Cruz area.314  This more limited intimidation is probably easier to achieve 
because fewer surfers need to be excluded and the remaining surfers will benefit 
from the practice and may offer tacit support. 
 
The exclusion of less favoured surf craft is a hybrid of an ‘exclusion strategy’ and a 
‘governance strategy’ in the sense outlined by Henry Smith.315  An exclusion strat-
egy is based on restricting access to a resource while a governance strategy man-
ages a common resource by regulating individual activities rather than access.316  
Under a hybrid strategy, access is denied ‘on the basis of features or activities of the 
potential entrant.’317  An example of a hybrid strategy in communal fishing grounds 
would be ‘rules that exclude anyone with a certain type of gear (for example, a net 
as opposed to a line).’318  The exclusion of longboarders and wave-ski riders is very 
similar to this kind of regulation in fishing.  Just as nets can make catching large 
numbers of fish easier, the increased paddle speed of longboards and wave-skis 
makes catching waves easier.  Thus, locals concerned about the effects of crowding 
often start by excluding the surfers who are the biggest threat to their waves.  Of 
course, a horde of longboarders will not cause permanent depletion of the surfers’ 
commons in the way that net fishing could destroy a fishery.  Thus, surfers who 
exclude longboarders are looking out for more immediate interests.  Nevertheless, 
by excluding less favoured groups of surfers, locals can mitigate the effects of 
severe overcrowding. 
 
4 Cash localism 
Cash localism raises its own theoretical issues.  This form of localism can be di-
vided into two subclasses.  First, there is localism that is simply tied to the owner-
ship of land.  This is the localism practiced at the Hollister Ranch.  Second, there is 
cash localism that is tied to ownership plus development.  This kind of localism is 
found in Tuvarua and some other ‘surf resorts’.  I evaluate these subclasses of cash 
localism separately. 
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Ordinary surfer localism centres on the close ties between the locals.  This is shown 
by the requirement that an aspiring local spend a lengthy period paying dues and 
showing deference to the more established locals.  The cash localism of the Hollis-
ter Ranch is different because it allows a new property owner to become a local 
instantly.  Thus, it might seem that cash localism would be harder to maintain 
because the locals will not have the close bonds formed through the dues paying 
process.  Nevertheless, Ranch localism is considered to be very successful and 
fierce.  This needs to be explained. 
 
Two factors explain the success of Ranch localism.  First, by using ownership of 
property as the barrier for entry the locals are able to keep exclusion costs much 
lower than most other groups of locals.  By banding together as property owners, 
Ranch surfers have removed all land access to the surf.  This will help compensate 
for any loss of close-knittedness among the locals.  Second, the purchase of prop-
erty demonstrates a long term commitment to the area.  Typically, locals will not 
know if a new visitor intends to devote time to a new break.  Thus, it would make 
no sense to immediately accept a new visitor as a local.  In contrast, when a new 
owner paddles out for the first time at the Ranch, he or she has paid at least 
$125,000 for the privilege.  Thus, Ranch locals can have confidence that the visitor 
is in it for the long haul.  
 
Is Ranch localism better justified than ordinary surfer localism?  The Ranch is 
widely acknowledged to contain some of California’s best preserved coastline.  
Even excluded surfers begrudgingly admit this.  As Nick Carroll writes: ‘The Ranch 
smacks of nasty elitism, but in fact it works: the coastline remains pristine, and a 
good day’s surfing there is filled with an extraordinary sense of serene beauty.’319  
Nevertheless, the pristine state of the Ranch cannot be credited to surfer localism.  
The Ranch owners exclude everybody, not just surfers.  In fact, the owners have 
been waging a long and bitter battle against attempts to improve public access to 
that part of the coast.320  As a result of this intransigence, The Ranch is one of the 
few places specifically named in the California Coastal Act, a law intended to 
guarantee public access to the state’s coastline.321  Decades after this law was en-
acted, owners at The Ranch are still able to exclude visitors.322 
 
Thus, surfer localism is only a small part of any explanation of the pristine state of 
The Ranch.  The Ranch’s owners use the tactics of surfer localism to extend their 
property rights into the public domain but it is their land-based property rights that 
best explain the pristine environment.  Surfer localism only helps discourage boat-
ers and these visitors are not likely to cause extensive damage to the Ranch coast-
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line.  Moreover, as explained above, the visiting surfers will not deplete the supply 
of waves as this is a resource unaffected by overuse. 
 
The localism practiced at surf resorts is unique because it is tied to commercial 
development.  I argued above that localism is not supported by the usual arguments 
advanced in favour of property rights.  These arguments are based on a claim that 
the long term incentives created by property rights encourage both development and 
good environmental management.323  I argued that these claims are weak when 
applied to localism because the surfers’ commons cannot be improved through 
development and is not threatened with permanent depletion.  Surf resorts may be a 
counter-example to my argument.  The ability to claim a property right over a surf 
break could be an important factor motivating a tourist development.  Of course, 
this development will not improve the quality of the surf break.  Nevertheless, the 
development may improve the local economy.  Thus, this form of cash localism 
does not help surfers but it could be good for non-surfing local residents.  This 
conclusion is supported by the observation that this form of localism is enforced by 
non-surfing local tribes rather than by surfers. 
VI RESPONSES TO LOCALISM 
 
The battle for the soul of surfing is captured in a story about some graffiti in Byron 
Bay, Australia.  Following the lead of locals all around the world, local surfers had 
painted ‘Locals Only’ near The Pass surf break.324  In response, the graffiti was 
altered to read ‘Love Only.’325  This Part reviews attempts to encourage cooperation 
in the surf and to prevent the worst aspects of surfer localism. 
 
A Norm reinforcement 
As noted above, many theorists believe that norms offer a powerful and cheap way 
to solve collective action problems.326  Some commentators also suggest that norms 
are highly changeable and that norms can be changed through intentional interven-
tion.327  Taken together, these points suggest that norms can be a useful tool of 
public policy.  The tag ‘New Chicago School’ has been applied to the theorists who 
suggest that the intentional manipulation of norms is a way to achieve social policy 
goals.328 
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Intentional manipulation of norms can come from private actors or from govern-
ment.329  Members of the New Chicago School are supportive of government inter-
vention.330 Governments can influence norms through education, persuasion, 
incentives such as taxes or outright prohibition.331  The government may also be 
able to influence norms through the so-called ‘expressive power’ of law.332  In 
opposition to these views, Eric Posner is sceptical of the power of governments to 
effect positive change though changing social norms.  Posner suggests that positive 
change is more likely to come from nongovernmental movements.333  
 
Surfing is not of much concern in Chicago.  Nevertheless, the general idea of the 
New Chicago School has been applied to the surfing world.  As surfing is almost 
entirely governed by informal norms an obvious response to any problems (such as 
increased violence in the surf) would be to try to change or reinforce norms.  In 
fact, both governmental and nongovernmental organisations have explicitly tried to 
influence surf norms.  The surfing community has responded to the worst aspects of 
localism by attempting to reinforce the healthy surfing norms.  These efforts have 
included posters and signs near breaks, educational efforts and even law school 
conferences.   
 
Surfline’s Bill of Lefts and Rights is an attempt to educate surfers about the coop-
erative norms of surfing.334  Surfline’s website is one of surfing’s most popular 
media sources receiving approximately one million unique visits per month.335  
After the editors at Surfline began to receive many enquiries about surf etiquette 
they decided to provide a reference for new surfers.336  Their account of surf eti-
quette was developed by a group of Surfline editors and was intended to be ‘mostly 
observational of what’s really out there but with an optimistic perspective.’337  They 
hope that their site will educate new surfers and help them avoid conflict.338 
 
Other attempts to educate surfers about surf etiquette have come from the Surfrider 
Foundation.  While the ‘core business’ of the Surfrider Foundation remains marine 
conservation,339 the foundation has responded to surfing violence and localism in 
Australia and the United States.340  In Australia, the foundation has prepared posters 
and plaques explaining the cooperative norms of surfing and has placed these 
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plaques at a number of popular surf breaks.341 Similar plaques have also been 
placed at some breaks in the United States.342 
 
Surfrider has even responded to localism in Palos Verdes.  After a well publicised 
assault on a visiting surfer, the local Surfrider chapter organised a ‘peaceful, non 
violent surfing session, paddle-out and beach clean-up to show our surfing commu-
nity’s commitment to putting an end to Palos Verdes localism.’343  This event took 
place at a break known as Indicators which is notoriously localised by another gang 
of Palos Verdes surfers known as the Dirty Underwear Gang.344 
 
Support for surfing’s cooperative norms has even come from a law school.  Austra-
lia’s Southern Cross University has organised two forums on the ‘Law of the 
Surf’.345  Participants at the forums were concerned that formal legal regulation 
might arise if surfers fail to apply their informal norms.  ‘The objective of the Law 
of the Surf Forum was to promote the universally accepted lore of surfing recog-
nised by the surfing community so that surfing remains free of government regula-
tive intervention and preserves the Free Spirit of Surfing.’346  Justice Greg James of 
the Supreme Court of New South Wales claimed that ‘[t]he responsibility for regu-
lating the surf should be on those using the surf . . . [t]he consciousness that it needs 
to be done, or the law will regulate it for us, has got to be expanded.’347 
 
The City of Santa Cruz provides a rare example of a government attempt to rein-
force the cooperative norms of surfing.348  The City is planning to distribute bro-
chures explaining the cooperative norms of surfing.349  Nevertheless, the general 
consensus among surfers is that norm reinforcement will not succeed without grass-
roots support from surfers.350  This may explain why most attempts to support 
surfing norms have come from private organisations.  Also, surfers’ hostility to 
formal regulation351 may explain their preference for privately organised campaigns 
of norm reinforcement.   
 
B Existing law 
Heavy localism relies on tactics, such as threats, property damage and violence that 
are subject to criminal sanctions.  Thus, shouldn’t existing criminal law provide the 
best response to the worst aspects of localism?  Criminal law has proved inadequate 
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for a number of reasons.  These include underreporting by victims of localism, the 
difficulty of prosecution, jury sympathy for white middle class defendants and 
police inattention and complicity.  Together, these factors have made criminal law 
relatively ineffective.  Nevertheless, there is some evidence that surfers may be 
deterred if they perceive a credible threat of prosecution for violent activity. 
 
California provides a number of examples of surfers facing criminal sanctions for 
localism violence.352  The following example from San Francisco’s Fort Point is 
illustrative.  Fort Point is one of the world’s most photogenic surf breaks.  The 
waves there peel along a rocky point directly underneath the Golden Gate Bridge.  
Fort Point is a challenging break to ride and is also notorious for localism and 
violence.  On March 28, 2002, Adam Browning arrived at Fort Point for an after 
work surf.353  He was immediately confronted and assaulted by three surfers.354  He 
was badly beaten and even held underwater leading him to fear for his life.355  After 
being assaulted in the water Browning emerged from the surf ‘with a broken nose, a 
gash over one eye and bruises all over his body.’356  A tourist caught the assault on 
tape.  ‘The tape’s last images are vivid. Browning has struggled to shore.  He sits on 
rocks, dazed.  [Ryan] Farrell comes up, shouts, then rams his fist straight into 
Browning’s face.’357 
 
Browning’s attackers were arrested by federal park police.358  Ryan Farrell and 
Yoel Gorfain pleaded to misdemeanour assault charges.359  When sentencing Far-
rell, the magistrate judge noted that Farrell’s behaviour had deterred other surfers 
from visiting Fort Point: 
 
‘That [video] was hard to watch,’ magistrate judge James Larson told Far-
rell. ‘It’s hard to imagine any reasonable circumstance that would lead to 
that kind of rage. . . . You disgraced yourself and your family not only in 
this but in other incidents. You became a virtual legend. I’ve heard that 
women don’t go there (Fort Point) to surf because of people like you.’360 
 
Despite these harsh words, none of Browning’s attackers received custodial sen-
tences.361  This is consistent with a general trend of light sentences for localism 
violence.362 
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An interesting aspect of the Fort Point case, and of some other criminal prosecu-
tions of surfers, is the creative use of probation conditions to keep perpetrators 
away from the breaks they terrorise.  Ryan Farrell was prohibited from visiting any 
Bay Area beaches on federal land for three years.363  After a conviction for localism 
violence in Los Angeles, David Ortega was jailed for five days and prohibited from 
surfing his local break for three years as a condition of his probation.364  He was 
caught surfing a few days after his sentencing and spent 6 months in jail as a re-
sult.365 
 
The incident at Fort Point was unusual in that it was captured on video, making 
prosecution relatively easy.366  Most intimidation by locals is not captured on video 
nor reported to authorities.367  Recall that locals often rely on threats to deter visit-
ing surfers.368  This low level intimidation is almost never reported because surfers 
realise that prosecution would be almost impossible.369  Similarly, violent actions 
that do not result in injury (such as an attempt to spear another surfer with a board) 
are very rarely reported.370  Police and lifeguards tend only to see only a subset of 
the most serious cases involving physical injury.371  This makes responding to 
localism very difficult. 
 
In Palos Verdes, visiting surfers have alleged that the local police department turns 
a blind eye to violence by the local surf gangs.  After being assaulted at the Palos 
Verdes break known as Indicators, Timothy Banas brought a civil suit against 
members of the ‘Dirty Underwear Gang’.372  Banas also sued Palos Verdes Estates 
alleging: 
 
[T]he Palos Verdes Estates Police Department has a custom and practice of 
ignoring complaints made to it by victims of crime perpetrated by the 
Dirty Underwear Gang. . . . In many cases . . . the Palos Verdes Estates Po-
lice Department threatened and intimidated victims not to press charges 
against members of the Dirty Underwear Gang. . . .  [The Department] al-
lows the Dirty Underwear Gang to use and claim the surfing locations de-
scribed herein as their own property and allows the building of non-
permitted buildings, shacks, concrete changing areas and barbecue pits on 
public land by the Dirty Underwear Gang for their sole use.  The Palos 
Verdes Police Department, or at least a substantial number of its officers, 
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view the Dirty Underwear Gang’s activities as helpful to them in being 
‘proactive’ and keeping ‘undesirables’ out of their city.373 
 
Unsurprisingly, the police denied these claims.374  Police Chief Timm Browne 
claims that ‘the city has responded [to localism] by aiming a surveillance camera at 
the surf break and briefly had undercover cops, posing as outsiders, paddling into 
the lineup.’375  
 
While these recent actions from the police are an improvement, they seem mainly to 
be a response to recent bad publicity.376  Violent localism has been a serious prob-
lem in Palos Verdes for decades.  Moreover, the Palos Verdes Police Department 
has encountered community opposition to their increased attention to surfer local-
ism.377  The Bay Boys went door-to-door in Palos Verdes to mobilise the commu-
nity against the surf cameras.378  The first camera was placed at Indicators but the 
city had plans to add another camera at Lunada Bay itself.379  The camera at Indica-
tors was provided free by Surfline who published its images on the web.  The pro-
posed camera at Lunada Bay was to be sponsored by the Surfrider Foundation and 
was also to be available on Surfline’s website. 
 
The Bay Boys claimed that these cameras would lead to ‘an impending crush of 
surfers who would clog residential streets, strip naked as they changed into wet-
suits, urinate in bushes and leave trash.’380  The affluent residents were swayed by 
these concerns and subsequent community pressure lead to the removal of the 
cameras.381  Thus, it appears that, in Palos Verdes at least, the non-surfing commu-
nity shares the local surf gangs’ hostility to visitors and is willing to help undermine 
police efforts to crack down on localism violence.  In such an environment, it is 
hardly surprising that visiting surfers do not believe that local authorities will vig-
orously pursue complaints against the surf gangs. 
 
While criminal enforcement has tended to be ineffective against localism, the pos-
sibility of criminal sanctions may deter the some violence.  Burleigh Heads local 
Dwayne Harris claims that increased enforcement has lead to a reduction in vio-
lence at his break.  He claims that ‘[i]t was worse in the ’70s and ’80s, the laws 
were a lot more lax then . . . [t]hese days you can’t hit people.’382  Similarly, the 
threat of criminal sanctions moderates the actions of locals at Maroubra, New South 
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Wales.  The locals there (known as the ‘Bra Boys’) will still fight with visitors but 
‘the fight’s usually over when the victim hits the ground.’383  Bra Boy Jai Abberton 
explains that ‘[s]ome of the boys have done time . . . so they’re not going to jump 
on a bloke because it’s not worth the risk [of being charged with assault and sent 
back inside].’384  Thus, it appears that, even if it cannot defeat localism, criminal 
law may be able to deter its worst excesses so long as the locals have a genuine fear 
of enforcement.  So, while the breaks like Lunada Bay are never likely to be wel-
coming places, it may be that the police could protect visitors from the risk of 
serious assault. 
 
C Legislative proposals / regulation 
The limitations of existing criminal law led Chris Brewster, San Diego’s chief 
lifeguard, to propose a law, called the California Open Waves Act (‘Waves Act’), 
specifically aimed at controlling surfer localism.385  Chris Brewster’s original idea 
was to create a new law criminalising any intimidation aimed at excluding others 
from a surf break.386  After consulting with a local assistant district attorney, he 
modified the proposal.387  The final proposal contained two elements.388  First, it 
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included an expressive declaration that the ‘the surf belongs equally to everyone.’389  
Second, it toughened penalties for the existing crimes of battery and threatening 
‘wherein the act was accomplished during an attempt to intimidate or prevent an-
other person from exercising lawful use of ocean resources.’390  The Waves Act 
provided for a minimum sentence of 30 days custody for a first offence or 60 days 
for a battery occurring in the water.391   The Act also declared a surfboard a deadly 
weapon ‘when used in an attempt to injure another person.’392 
 
Brewster sent the proposed Waves Act to the City of San Diego’s 1999 legislative 
sponsorship program.393  Brewster had previously convinced the city to propose 
new state law and he is the original drafter of a number of California laws such as 
the California Boating Safety Act of 1999.394  In this case, Brewster suggested that 
local surfing organisations could be enlisted to support the Waves Act.395  Brewster 
also predicted that the proposal would receive positive coverage in the surf me-
dia.396  These two predictions turned out to be completely incorrect.397  The pro-
posal received quite negative coverage in the surf media and was very poorly 
received in the surf community.398  With the proposal lacking support, the City of 
San Diego decided not to sponsor the Waves Act and it never even got a hearing in 
Sacramento.399 
 
Chris Brewster underestimated the surfing community’s hostility to the formal 
regulation of surfing.  This attitude appears to be almost universal among surfers.  I 
encountered many expressions of opposition to regulation while researching this 
article.400  This attitude is not simply anti-lawyer prejudice.  The participants at the 
University of Southern Cross’s forums about surfing, many of whom were lawyers 
or judges, also expressed hostility to the idea of formal regulation of surfing.401  
Surfers’ hostility to regulation is reminiscent of the attitudes of Acheson’s lobster-
men.  Acheson noted that the lobstermen tend to believe that ‘the government has 
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no business attempting to regulate the fishing industry.’402  Similarly, many surfers 
believe that any regulation of surfing is an assault of their freedom.403  This cultural 
attitude makes the failure of the Waves Act unsurprising. 
 
Surfers’ hostility to regulation is also seen in their opposition to tort remedies for 
injuries sustained in the surf.  Despite Australia’s large and active population of 
surfers, tort actions brought by one surfer against another are extremely rare.  In 
fact, in 2000 Professor Stanley Yeo claimed that ‘in Australia there has never been 
a negligence action brought by one surfer against another surfer.’404  Moreover, 
surfing organisations have actively campaigned against tort actions for surfing 
injuries.  In Fluehr v City of Cape May, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered 
an award of damages to a plaintiff who was injured while body surfing.405  The 
plaintiff claimed that the city was liable for negligent supervision and failure to 
warn about the risks of the surf.406  The Surfers’ Environmental Alliance-New 
Jersey and Surfrider Foundation both participated in the case as amici curiae and 
argued against liability.  These amici were ‘concerned that, as a result of the Appel-
late Division’s decision [in favour of the plaintiff], municipalities will address the 
potential dangers of the ocean by restricting access to coastal waters, especially 
when the ocean is rough, thereby unduly limiting those who revel in the challenges 
presented by rough, breaking seas.’407  Thus, surfers even see the tort system as a 
potential enemy of their freedom to access the waves. 
 
The Waves Act was aimed at localism.  It is also possible to imagine regulation 
aimed directly at controlling overcrowding.  Given that extreme overcrowding can 
ruin surfing for everyone, it might seem that surfers would be better off allowing 
access to some of the most crowded breaks to be regulated.  One option would be 
the use of a permit system similar to those used for popular hiking trails in national 
parks.   I have found little discussion of such ideas.  The discussion that exists is 
negative.  For example, Justice Greg James bemoans ‘the horrible thought that you 
might have to stand on the beach, along side one of those machines they have in the 
delicatessen, and take up a ticket with a number on and wait until your number 
comes up to be able to enter the water.’408 
 
Hostility to the idea of surfing permits is a component of surfers’ hostility to any 
government regulation of surfing.  Permits are likely to be particularly unattractive, 
however.  First, a permit system could equalise access to the waves among locals 
and non-locals.  Thus, permits would be disadvantageous to organised and close-
                                                        
402
 Acheson, above, n 252, 260 (also noting that lobstermen believe that it is ‘immoral to inform on 
another lobsterman’). 
403
 See Surf Forum 1, above n 43, 236 (commentary by Professor Stanley Yeo) (discussing an online 
forum about the regulation of surfing).  
404
 Ibid 234; see also Brian Fitzgerald and Joanne Harrison, ‘Law of the Surf’ (2003) 77 Australian Law 
Journal 109, 114 (noting that although swimmers and body surfers have sued local municipalities for 
surf related injuries, ‘there has not been a reported case of two surfers suing each other in a civil action’). 
405
  See Fluehr v City of Cape May, 732 A 2d 1035 (1999). 
406
  See ibid 1038. 
407
  Ibid. 
408
  Surf Forum 1, above n 43, 233 (commentary by Justice Greg James). 
2004 The Tragicomedy of the Surfers’ Commons  713     
 
knit locals.  The Bay Boys would find surfing permits even more threatening to 
their domination of Lunada Bay than the camera they defeated.  Thus, opposition to 
permits from locals is likely to be fierce.  If permits favoured locals (as parking 
permit systems often do) they may get more support from locals but they would 
likely encounter just as strong opposition from non-locals. 409  Moreover, any permit 
system would be expensive to run and enforce, so the permits would probably 
involve a fee.  A surfing fee of any kind would be very unattractive to most surfers 
who believe that surfing should be free.410 
 
VI CONCLUSION 
 
Sometimes surfers get along and sometimes they beat each other up.  A compli-
cated, cross-cultural set of cooperative norms helps ensure that the former is more 
common than the latter.  Overall, surfing norms are a success story as they help 
millions of people share a valued resource that is usually left completely open to the 
public.  Thus, surfing provides an excellent example of the power of extra-legal 
social norms to efficiently regulate public resources.   
 
Despite the successes of surfing’s cooperative norms, some surf breaks are domi-
nated by surfers who practice exclusionary localism.  These locals, like Acheson’s 
lobster gangs, have carved little fiefdoms out of the public domain.  Unlike the 
lobster gangs, however, these surf gangs cannot justify their actions on the basis of 
resource conservation.  The surfers’ commons is not subject to the same threat of 
permanent depletion so exclusionary localism should be seen as an unjustified 
appropriation of the public domain. 
 
Exclusionary localism can even be violent and dangerous.  Community groups and 
governments have tried to respond to this threat.  Existing criminal law is not very 
effective at combating localism although it may be able to deter the most violent 
assaults associated with localism.  Other legal responses, such as the proposed Open 
Waves Act, have been unsuccessful in the face of widespread surfer opposition to 
government regulation.  This opposition means that private ‘norm-reinforcement’ 
and existing criminal law are the most productive tools to use against the worst 
elements of localism. 
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